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Essays in Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance
Fangzhou Shi
This dissertation delves into ownership structure and corporate governance. The rst chapter
investigates the causal link between business group aliation and new rms' protability.
To overcome selection issues related to group aliation, I focus on ownership changes at
least two levels away in the ownership chain that lead to a change in group aliation. I
provide evidence suggesting that these unintentional changes are likely exogenous. I nd
that business group aliation leads to a 12% increase in new rms' protability during the
rst six years. I further present evidence consistent with two channels. First, new rms
quickly increase revenues and expand market shares after joining business groups, possibly
leveraging on groups' marketing networks. Second, group aliation triggers a higher ratio
of top manager turnover and leads to more experienced top managers and more produc-
tive employees. It is possible that business groups provide a talent pool of managers and
better monitor new rms' labor force. Results suggest that business groups parallel the
role of venture capital rms in sponsoring new rms in economies with concentrated equity
ownership.
The second chapter examines the impact of input and product market competition on
private benets of control (PBC), as measured by the voting premia between shares with
dierential voting rights. The main ndings are three. First, increases in the intensity of
competition lead to lower estimates of PBC. Second, competition signicantly reduces the
dispersion in the voting premia, aecting especially the top of the PBC distribution. Third,
competition eects are particularly prominent in weak-rule-of-law countries, in manufactur-
ing industries and in less-protable rms. Overall, the results show that competition leads
to a meaningful reduction in the level and dispersion of PBC.
The third chapter directly examines the correlation between insider trading and executive
compensation at the rm level. Using panel data on US rms from 1992 to 2011, we nd
that 1% decrease in cash compensation leads to a 21.7 percentage points increase in 6-month
buy-and-hold excess returns, as well as a large increase in trading prots. These results
indicate that insiders are using insider trading as a substitute to cash compensation, and
keeping the total direct compensation level less volatile than previous research relied on.
This eect is robust to exogenous shock to insider trading return, such as Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. The result suggests the importance to take into account of insider trading prot
in context of executive compensation.
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Business groups that function as legally independent rms and that are connected with
common concentrated equity ownership are a dominant structure outside of the United
States.1 Several studies show that such groups are also widespread in the new rm sector
(Rosa and Scott, 1999; Iacobucci, 2002; Bena and Ortiz-Molina, 2013). As shown in this
chapter, business groups are a pervasive ownership structure for new rms across industries
in European countries.2 Its dominant role dwarfs other common ownership structures for
new rms, such as venture capital (VC).
The total eect of business group aliation is controversial. On the one hand, business
group aliation could be benecial to group members by providing nancing advantages,
improving operating eciency,3 promoting R&D investment and knowledge spillovers,4 and
creating an internal labor market (Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Belenzon and Andrea, 2011).
On the nancing advantage, group members can leverage the group's internal capital market5
and reputation (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Gomes, 2000), receive contingent support,6 and
share risk among group members (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). All of these benets make the
business group an ideal ownership structure for new rms, which tend to be nancially con-
strained, vulnerable to nancial shocks, highly risky, but active in innovation. On the other
1For both empirical evidence and theoretical background, refer to La Porta et al. (1999); Claessens et al.
(2000); Khanna (2000); and Morck et al. (2005).
2In the period from 1999 to 2008, 11.2% of new rms belonged to business groups. These group aliated
new rms account for 50.6% of total assets, 46.3% of total revenues, and 38.9% of employees in the new rm
sector. Detailed statistics are shown in Table A.1, Table A.2, and Table A.3.
3Hamelin (2011), Lechner and Leyronas (2009), and Iacobucci and Rosa (2005).
4Sea-Jin et al. (2006), Belenzon and Berkovitz (2010), and Hsieh et al. (2010).
5Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006), Almeida et al. (2011), and Masulis et al. (2011).
6Morck and Nakamura (1999), Gopalan et al. (2007), and Gopalan et al. (2014).
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hand, certain disadvantages of group aliation may be more severe for new rms. Among
the various means of expropriation by the ultimate owner, the most notorious phenomenon
is tunneling. New rms usually gravitate to the bottom of the ownership chains, where the
diversion incentives are larger.
In this chapter, I aim to establish a causal link between business group aliation and new
rms' protability, based on comprehensive ownership and nancial data about new rms
from 24 European countries. I also aim to provide evidence on the contributing mechanisms
of the protability change.
Regarding the causal eect of business group aliation on rms, appropriately addressing
selection is perhaps the most important task. In an ideal setting, new rms are assigned to
groups or non-groups randomly. However, this cannot be realized since acquisitions (spin-
os) are not random. Instead, I propose a quasi-experimental setting, where the group
status change is an unintentional result of ownership changes above the parent shareholder
level. Intuitively, when a rm at the top of the ownership chain is acquired by a business
group, holding other ownership links constant, rms at the bottom of the ownership chain
(subsidiaries, sub-subsidiaries, etc.) also join the business group unintentionally. The same
logic applies to rms that unintentionally leave business groups. More precisely, I require the
ownership stake in the new rm from any parent shareholder to be constant during the group
status change. In this setting, the unintentional claim is motivated by two facts. First, new
rms are much smaller compared to the groups and parent shareholders. Therefore, they
are expected to take a negligible weight in the acquisition decision. Second, if the acquirer's
major incentive is to share cash ows of the bottom rm, the weakly dominant strategy is
to acquire the bottom rm directly, instead of acquiring the bottom rm through its parent
shareholder. I present an example in Appendix A.2 to clarify this setting. A new rm
Active Audio was partially owned by Electronatec. In 2006, Electronatec was acquired by
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ECA, which belonged to a huge family controlled business group. During the acquisition,
Electronatec did not change its stake in Active Audio at all. As a result, Active Audio also
became a member of the same business group. It is noteworthy that Active Audio was a
tiny part of Electronatec and rarely mentioned as one of the acquisition incentives. In fact,
its business was not directly related to the synergies claimed in the ling.7 All of these
observations suggest that Active Audio's group aliation was unintentional.
I provide two sets of tests to investigate the validity of this setting. First, since any new
rm with corporate parent shareholder(s) is a candidate for unintentional change, I check
the ex-ante dierence between new rms that unintentionally change group status, and other
new rms with parent shareholder(s). Results show that these two sets of rms are similar,
in terms of common observable characteristics such as size, growth rate, and protability.
Second, I check whether group eects vary by the relative importance of new rms. If
changes in ownership above the parent level are driven by the new rm at the bottom, more
important new rms are expected to take on increased weight in the acquisition decisions.
Therefore, group eects should be stronger for them. I use the relative size of the new rm
to the group or parent shareholder(s) as a proxy for importance. After splitting the sample
into joining groups (group aliation) and leaving groups (group detachment), I nd that the
group aliation eect is actually driven by less important rms, while the group detachment
eect does not vary. Results of these tests justify the unintentional claim for identication.
Using the above quasi-experimental setting, I carry out a dierence-in-dierences analy-
sis, through investigating the change of protability based on both non-parametric matching
and multivariate OLS regressions. My studies show that group aliation leads to a 12%
increase in protability, while group detachment has an insignicant eect. Comparing
the results across models shows that selection issues are against the group aliation and the
7ECA Group Annual Report, 2006.
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group detachment eect. That is, less protable rms are acquired by business groups, while
more protable rms are spun o, after controlling for observable characteristics. Without
addressing selection issues, comparison of group versus non-group rms would underestimate
the group aliation eect, and overestimate the group detachment eect.
After establishing the positive group aliation eect on a new rm's protability, I inves-
tigate and present two major mechanisms. First, similar to VC rms, business groups may
draw on their networks to support group members and help them increase revenue. Consis-
tent with this projection, I nd that revenue (scaled by the lagged total assets) increases by
5% upon joining a group. With a stable gross prot margin, this growth in revenue translates
to growth in gross prot and accounts for 44% of the increase in protability. Meanwhile,
a new rm's market share in its industry increases by 14%. Additionally, the expansion
magnitudes double when the business group has a higher market share in the same industry.
Consistent with the revenue-oriented growth, I nd that the group aliation eect is more
signicant in the retail and wholesale sector. All of these eects are comparable to the VC's
role in supporting portfolio companies (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Hochberg et al., 2007).
The second potential channel is that group aliation might provide the new rm with
better quality labor. Indeed, my studies show that joining a group doubles the top manager
turnover ratio. About 30% of those new managers are from other rms within the same
group. Management experience, measured by the tenure of the top managers across dier-
ent rms, increases by 24%. In addition, monitoring, training, and even replacement are not
restricted to the top managers. The average productivity of employees also improves signif-
icantly, captured by revenue generated per employee (13%), prot generated per employee
(18%), and the marginal productivity of labor measure (Larrain and Stumpner, 2013) (7%)
for the manufacturing sector. Again, these results suggest that business groups parallel the
role of VC in cultivating new rms (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Hellmann and Puri, 2002).
5
Overall, my results contribute to three strands of research. First, this chapter documents
the comprehensive role of business groups in sponsoring new rms and their causal eect on
new rms' protability. Although there is a vast literature about group eects on general
rms, less attention has been given to its eects on new rms. Existing research on new rms
are limited as they either focuses on one country (Rosa and Scott, 1999) or one industry
(Iacobucci, 2002; Bena and Ortiz-Molina, 2013). I show that business groups are a dominant
structure for new rms across 24 countries and 21 two-digit NAICS industries. The quasi-
experimental setting helps establish the causal link and lls the void of methods addressing
selection for new rms. Extensive research studying correlations between group aliation
and performance is based on comparisons of group rms versus non-group rms. Khanna
and Yafeh (2007) point out that these comparisons are plagued with selection issues, the
most obvious one being the assumption that group aliation is exogenous. Several methods
have been proposed to address the selection issue but none of them can be applied to studies
of new rms. For example, some research studies use a rm's idiosyncratic risk as the
instrument (Himmerlberg et al., 1999; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Masulis et al., 2011).
Unfortunately, this could only be applied to public rms that have available market price.
New rms tend to be dominated by private rms. Alternatively, leveraging the exogenous
change of inter-corporate tax policy is appealing (Morck, 2005; Sautner and Villalonga, 2010).
Nevertheless, there are three barriers to applying it in my setting. First, there is the limited
variation of tax policy, in particular the inter-corporate dividend tax, during the same period
in Europe. Second, the change of inter-corporate policy may take a long time to aect a rm's
ownership structure (Kandel et al., 2013). Third, new rms are less sensitive to the change
of these tax policies as they rarely generate dividends during their early years. Spin-os
from business groups are biased towards more established rms. Therefore, neither inter-
corporate dividend tax nor capital gain tax has a strong eect on the new rm's aliation
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status. In fact, in-sample investigation shows that variations of inter-corporate tax rates are
weakly correlated with one specic new rm's aliation decision, after controlling for other
rm level characteristics.
Second, the two mechanisms proposed extend the discussion of business group aliation
benets. The expansion of revenue and market shares are consistent with the operating
benets of group aliation. An improvement of labor quality is related to both the direct
managerial support from business groups and the internal labor market created by the busi-
ness groups. Third, my research ndings are related to the research on corporate venture
capitalists (CVC). Ivanov and Xie (2010) emphasize that the positive role of CVCs lies on a
strategic t between new rms and the parent companies of CVCs. This is consistent with
my nding that operating synergies are a major part of aliation benets during the early
years.
1.2 Methodology
In this section, I rst discuss the group construction procedure. Then I propose the quasi-
experimental setting used to establish causal link. Finally, I describe major specications
used.
1.2.1 Identication of business groups
I use a similar method as Almeida et al. (2011) to identify business groups, based on inter-
corporate ownership links.8 This method takes into account all of the ownership links among
8While each rm (including every corporate shareholder) has a unique BvD identication number in the
database, individual shareholders can only be identied by name. Therefore, I only focus on inter-corporate
ownership links to precisely construct business groups. As a result, all of the ultimate owners are rms
instead of individual investors.
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group members. Business groups are identied in two steps: rms are assigned to dierent
clusters; further restrictions are imposed to qualify clusters as business groups. Specically,
for a pre-selected cuto value α, rms are identied as either one of the following two types:
1. Ultimate owner of a cluster. This kind of rm does not have any corporate shareholder
with ownership stakes more than α. Each ultimate owner k belongs to a dierent
cluster Ck.
2. Cluster member. A cluster Ck is dened as a biggest-possible xed point:




6 ∃Cm(α) : Ck(α) ⊂ Cm(α),∀m
Cm(α) ∩ Cn(α) = ∅,∀m,n
where sji is the ownership stakes of shareholder j in rm i. That is, a rm i is a
member of cluster Ck as long as the sum of stakes from all other cluster members,
including the ultimate owner, exceeds the threshold value α. The cluster also has to
be the biggest possible one so that no other clusters could fully contain it. Last but
not least, clusters are mutually exclusive.9
Business groups are dened as clusters with more than ve rms and non-PE ultimate
owner. The former criterion ensures that there are enough members in each group. The
latter one ensures that group eects are not driven by portfolio companies of independent
VCs. Major results in this chapter are based on α = 30%. Clusters are constructed through
iterations.
9Appendix A.1 shows an example of cluster construction.
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1.2.2 Quasi-experimental Setting
To establish causal link between group aliation and protability, it is crucial that rms
exogeneously change the group aliation status. Simple comparison of group versus non-
group rms may be intuitive. Nevertheless, instead of being random, selection into (and
out of) a group is generally determined on both observable and unobservable variables.
Therefore, it is inappropriate to attribute any dierence based on simple comparison to
merely a distinct aliation status (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Alternatively, comparisons of
protability before and after group aliation only partially address this issue, by controlling
for time-invariant rm characteristics. The dierence based on comparison may still be
driven by other time-variate variables. In a nutshell, in the setting to investigate causal
eect, the selection of group aliation cannot be correlated with any other variables besides
controlled characteristics.
In this chapter, I propose a quasi-experimental setting where the change of aliation
status is unintentional. In this setting, none of the parent shareholders change their stake
in the new rm. The change in group status is due to ownership changes at least two levels
away in the ownership chain. For example, when a group acquires the parent company
without changing its stake in its subsidiary, the subsidiary joins the group unintentionally.
The acquisition decision is less likely to be driven by characteristics of the subsidiary. In
fact, if the characteristic of a rm aects the decision of acquisition, changing ownership
through its parent shareholder is weakly dominated by changing the ownership stake in it
directly. Generally, the ownership change may occur well above the parent level, e.g., rms
owning the parent rm may be acquired by the business group.
To be precise, a rm experiences an unintentional status change if:
1. There is an aliation status change. The rm either joins a group or leaves a group;
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2. None of its rst layer parent shareholders change their stake in the rm;
3. Neither the rm nor any layer of subsidiary change its stake in its subsidiary.
The common trade-o between causality identication and local eect also applies in my
setting. Since the denition of unintentional change implicitly requires that new rms al-
ready have at least one parent rm, estimation results are based on non-stand-alone rms.
Essentially, I push the selection issue between the parent rm and the new rm back to the
beginning of the sample. An example is presented in Appendix A.2 to clarify the denition.
1.2.3 Main Specications
I use the above quasi-experimental setting to do a dierence-in-dierence analysis. Since
both joining a group and leaving a group suer the selection problem, I rst split the sample
into these two parts to make the inference econometrically feasible. For each part, I keep
the rm in the sample up to one (unintentional) group status change.10 Eects of joining
a group are referred as group aliation eects, while eects of leaving a group are referred
as group detachment eects. Then I carry out the dierence-in-dierences analysis in two
settings.
The rst setting is based on the non-parametric comparison between the treatment sample
and control sample.11 For each rm that unintentionally joins (leaves) a business group, I nd
a control sample of rms which never (always) belong to a business group. This set of rms is
matched exactly on the incorporation country, industry, year, age and legal form.12 Besides,
10Major analysis through the chapter requires this change to be unintentional. To investigate the selection
issues, I also release this requirement for a general change in section 1.4.2.
11Following the experimental terminology, I call rms that experience group status change treatment
sample, while the set of matched rms control sample.
12I implement the exact matching using the STATA command psmatch2 of Egger et al. (2003). Results
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since any new rm with parent shareholder(s) is a candidate for unintentional change, the
matched rms are further required to have at least one parent shareholder. I then calculate
the average change of protability before and after unintentionally joining (leaving) business
groups, and repeat the calculation for the control sample. Finally I compare the dierence
in changes across two samples.
The second setting is an OLS multivariate regression model on a panel of rm level
observations. The panel data helps control time-invariant observations. I run following
regressions:
DepenV arit = α + β ·GroupDummyit + λ′FirmControlsi,t−1 + δct + µi + εit (1.1)
where GroupDummy is a binary variable taking value 1 if rm i belongs to a group at year
t, and 0 otherwise; FirmControls are one year lagged rm level variables; δct is the country
by year xed eect; µi is the rm xed eect; and εit is the error term. My measure of
reported protability, which captures a new rm's ability to generate pledgeable cash ows,
is operating income before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by the
lagged total assets (EBITDA/Total Assetst−1). I control for a set of rm level characteristics
correlated with the acquisition decision, including rm size (ln of Total Assets), leverage
ratio, tangibility (tangible asset scaled by total assets), age, and legal incorporation form.13
A positive coecient β indicates that the dependent variable is bigger when the rm is in
the group.
I run this specication on three dierent sub-samples. The rst sub-sample includes rms
are based on 7 nearest neighbor matching, and robust to 5 or 10 nearest neighbor matching.
13Since these control variables are not available for all rms in the sample, I imputed a value equal to
country-industry-year average to the missing observations and also included dummies for each variable that
equals one if the observation had been imputed. In this way, I do not lose observations, but can include the
controls. The results are similar if I do not impute the missing observations.
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originally non-group (group) aliated, but eventually join (leave) a group. Because entries
to (exits from) groups are staggered, these rms are both control and treatment rms. For
a rm that joins (leaves) a group, the control category includes non-group (group) rms
which would eventually become group (non-group) rms. The second sub-sample adds rms
that are never (always) group aliated to the rst sub-sample. Since any new rms with
corporate parent shareholder(s) are candidates for the unintentional change, I introduce a
dummy variable LagParentInd to indicate whether the rm has at least one corporate
shareholder one year before (taking value 1) or not (taking value 0). The third sub-sample
further adds rms always (never) belonging to groups. Adding the latter two sub-samples
only indirectly aects the identication of β through estimations of other coecients.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Data source
I use the Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) Amadeus database that contains data on private and
public companies spanning all industries in 42 European countries. BvD collects data from
dierent vendors across European countries. The data vendor of each country collects data
from rms' lings. Public companies are required to le accounts, while private company's
ling may not be obligatory, depending on the incorporation country, legal form and size.14
Although the coverage is not comprehensive due to ling requirements, in the 24 countries
used, it is comparable to and representative of the population of rms reported in aggregate
data by the European CommissionArellano et al. (2012).15
14Detailed country level criteria are available in Table 12 of Klapper et al. (2006).
15According to Egger et al. (2013b), specically to French data, Farid Toubal provided evidence on this
on the occasion of a discussion of Egger et al. (2013a), at the Globalization and Labor Market Outcomes:
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The advantage of Amadeus is that it covers young private rms, and contains detailed
ownership and accounting data. There are four major categories of data used in this chapter:
ownership information, prole information, top manager information,16 and accounting in-
formation. For each rm, the ownership information includes shareholder names, ownership
stakes, and shareholder types for both corporate shareholders and individual shareholders.
Prole information has the rm's name, incorporation date, and industry classication. Ac-
counting data reports 50 items from the standard balance sheet and income statement. And
manager information contains each top manager's name, function and date of birth.
All four categories are linked through a unique BvD identication number for each rm.
A company appears in Amadeus as long as its ling is available. And it is kept in the database
up to four years after its last ling. For the rst three categories, each update of Amadeus
reports the most recent information. For accounting information, only the most recent ten
years' data is contained. To construct a set of panel data and overcome the survival bias,
I use ten Amadeus DVD updates: June 2000 (the rst Amadeus DVD produced), June
2001, June 2002, June 2003, June 2004, June 2005, June 2006, June 2007, June 2008, and
June 2009. The resulting panel data gives a unique breadth of cross-sectional coverage since
Amadeus started to collect information (1995) to 2008.
1.3.2 Sample construction
The sample construction includes three steps: identication of business groups, identication
of new rms, and merging with other information. Since Amadeus signicantly expanded
coverage in 1998, I focus on observations from 1999 to 2008.
Recent Advance conference at Banque de France on May 16-17, 2013.
16Top managers are identied as managers with positions of CEO, Chief Manager, Chief Executive
Ocer, Person In Charge, Firm Manager, Managing Director, and President.
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Business groups are identied based on all available inter-corporate ownership links avail-
able in Amadeus during the sample period (42 countries and 9.6 million links). I take into
account a cross-border link even though the shareholder is in a country that is excluded from
the sample later. This aims to more precisely identify business groups, as cross-border links
are common among European rms.
To have enough observations for panel analysis, I identify new rms as those with ages
1-6 years old. This also takes into account that new rms may take 1 or 2 years after
incorporation to reach the threshold of ling nancial statements, and therefore appear in
the Amadeus database. Since the major protability measure uses lagged assets to scale the
prot, for each rm there are up to ve observations in the sample.
Starting with all of the new rms with available ownership information, I further impose
the following criteria: First, I exclude the countries of the former Republic of Yugoslavia
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro), which were at war during the sample period and
where company identication numbers changed frequently. Second, I exclude Cyprus, Liecht-
enstein, Moldova, Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia, which have a very small number of new
rms covered (less than 50 rms annually). Third, similar to Bena and Ortiz-Molina (2013),
I exclude Sweden and the Netherlands, which have incomplete information for small rms.
Fourth, I exclude Belarus, since it did't enter the Amadeus database until 2006. Fifth, I
exclude Lithuania where the protability measure is not available. Finally, I further exclude
the Ukraine and Russia where group aliated rms tend to be dominated by state-owned
enterprises. These restrictions exclude 264,706 rms over ten years (6.05% of total new
rms identied). At last I merge unconsolidated nancial information and top manager
information. The nal sample includes 1,048,782 rms and 2,059,688 observations.
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1.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 report the summary statistics of major variables used. They display
three general patterns: the sample has a good coverage of new rms; new rms are very
small; and there are signicant dierences between group rms and non-group rms. To
better understand the dierence across group status, I decompose the sample into three sub-
samples: always group rms, always non-group rms and rms ever change group status.
All variables are winsorized at the 1% level.
[Insert Table 3.1 here] [Insert Table 3.2 here]
Statistics in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show that rms enter the sample at a young age. On
average, a rm enters into the sample between the second and third year. Firms that ever
change their group status, which are key to the identication, enter the sample even earlier.
The average age is about three, equal to the mid-range of the sample. The unreported
median level of age shows an even younger prole.
A great portion of new rms are very small. The average total assets are only 2.96
million, and the average revenue is 10.24 million. Additionally, new rms hire less people, on
average with 21 employees. At last, new rms have limited market share in their industry,
indicated by the mean at 0.72h. Unreported medians show even smaller magnitudes and
suggest the sample is skewed to smaller rms.
There are also signicant dierences between group rms and non-group rms. Group
rms are bigger but less protable. Across the three measures, Total Assets, Fixed Assets
and Revenue, group rms are more than ten times bigger than non-group rms. They also
have seven times more employees. Nevertheless, they are ten times less protable, measured
either by EBITDA/Total Assett−1 or EBIT/Total Assett−1. Group rms not only generate
less revenue per unit of asset, but also have a lower gross prot margin. The dierences
between group and non-group rms are also extended to other measures, such as revenue,
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wage, and labor productivity.
The above dierences conrm that group rms are fundamentally dierent from non-
group rms. Group rms require more investment but have less pledgeable cash ow
(Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). The dierences also suggest that a simple comparison
of group rms versus non-group rms is inappropriate to document the group aliation
eect.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Group aliation improves protability
As a benchmark for the eect of business group aliation on protability, I start by in-
vestigating the dierence-in-dierences for rms unintentionally joining (leaving) business
groups based on nonparametric matching. Table 3.3 presents the results. It shows that
compared to control sample, unintentionally joining business groups signicantly improves
rm's protability (Panel A), while unintentionally leaving business groups (Panel B) has
an insignicant eect. Panel A, Column I reports the average protability two years before
unintentionally joining groups. It indicates that forthcoming group members, though less
protable compared to general new rms, are not signicantly dierent from their matched
rms ex-ante. Column II reports the average protability two years after joining groups, and
Column III reports the dierence between the rst two columns. Based on the dierence,
protability of forthcoming group members would increase by 0.028 (17.33% compared to
the sample average) after joining groups. Since common shocks (in the level of country, in-
dustry, year, age and etc.) may aect protability, it is inappropriate to attribute the whole
dierence to group aliation change. The control sample serves to ferry out those common
shocks. After taking out the same change for the control sample, the dierence-in-dierences
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statistic (based on mean) in the third column indicates that joining a group leads to 0.018
increase in protability, which is both statistically signicant at 1% level and economically
signicant (11.14% compared to the sample average). The signicant dierence across two
samples is further conrmed by the MannWhitney statistic. Panel B repeats the test for
rms unintentionally leaving business groups. Although previous group members also on
average experience an increase in protability after leaving the group, group detachment
insignicantly contributes to the change.
Figure 3.1 visualizes the dierence-in-dierences setting and conrms the ndings from
Table 3.3. It shows that the average protability level from two years before to two years
after rms joining business groups. The solid line, indicating rms unintentionally joining
business groups, ascends in a bigger magnitude compared to the dashed line, indicating rms
in the matched sample. Additionally, the increasing trend is not reverting after two years.
[Insert Figure 3.1 here]
Table 3.4 further conrms the signicant eect of group aliation (Panel A) and insignif-
icant eect of group detachment (Panel B) in a regression setting using specication 1.1.
Panel A, Column I shows that joining a group leads to 0.015 (9.47%) increase in protability
compared to the base category, which includes rms not belonging to a group but would join
groups later. Column II adds rm level control variables and shows that the group aliation
eect is in similar magnitude (7.68%). Column III and Column IV repeat the tests by adding
rms always non-group aliated into the base category. Column V and VI further add rms
always group aliated into the sample. Through all of the specications and samples, group
aliation eects are signicant, varying from 0.018 (10.83%) to 0.022 (13.37%). Panel B
reports the set of results for rms leaving business group. Across specications, group de-
tachment eects are insignicant. It is partially due to limited observations, as fewer rms
leave groups within the rst six years. In a nutshell, results in Table 3.4 indicate that the
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positive eect of group aliation on protability is signicant and robust.
1.4.2 Tests of identication strategy
In this section, I rst show that selection creates bias in the estimated group eect. Then I
provide evidence that the quasi-experimental setting is appropriate to correct the bias.
Selection issues are against group eects
To capture the eect of selection on estimates, I repeat tests in Table 3.4 in a general setting,
where selection into (out of) groups is not necessary to be unintentional. Firms are kept in
the sample up to one group aliation change, regardless of being unintentional or not. In
this setting, GroupDummy may be correlated with the error term in specication 1.1. This
would create a bias in the estimate for the coecient of GroupDummy.
Table 3.5 reports results in this general setting. Compared to Table 3.4, group aliation
eect is downward biased (Panel A), while group detachment is upward biased (Panel B).
In Panel A, estimates of group aliation eects are smaller across dierent specications,
compared to Table 3.4, Panel A. This indicates that selection is against group aliation.
Controlling for other variables, less protable rms are selected into business groups. There-
fore we would under-estimate the group aliation eect, without appropriately addressing
the selection issue. In Panel B, estimates of group detachment are bigger and more sig-
nicant compared to estimates in Table 3.4, Panel B. This indicates that leaving groups is
correlated with an increase in protability. But this is due to the fact that more protable
rms are spun o from business groups.
The adverse selection I nd is both intuitive and consistent with previous research. In-
tuitively, more protable rms would prefer to be standalone, while less protable rms
may sacrice self-control for group aliation benets. It also conrms the proposition that
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simple comparison between group versus non-group rms would lead to an underestimate
of the group aliation eect (Masulis et al., 2011; Bena and Ortiz-Molina, 2013). Theoreti-
cally, The direction of selection is jointly determined by supply of investment opportunities
and demand from investors. Gompers and Lerner (2000) shows that money is chasing for
limited good opportunity among new rms. Therefore entrepreneurs have more bargaining
power than investors. Consequently, on average, less protable rms are acquired by business
groups.
To sum up, selection issue is severe for group status change. It is critical to remedy it for
unbiased estimates. The quasi-experimental setting aims to address this issue. I will provide
evidence to justify the setting in the next section.
Unintentional group status change is exogenous
The causal link presented above lies on the validity of the quasi-experimental setting. It
assumes that unintentional selection into (out of) groups is exogenous to other omitted
variables, either observable or unobservable to econometrician. Although this assumption
cannot be directly tested, I provide two sets of tests to support this assumption.
The rst set of tests investigates the observable dierence between forthcoming (previous)
group members and other candidates for the unintentional change, right before the former
join (leave) business groups. Table 3.3, Column I already shows that the average protability
of forthcoming (previous) group members is not signicantly dierent from that of other new
rms with same matching criteria. I further investigate the dierence by running following
regression:
DepenV arit = α + β · TreatSampleit + λ′FirmControlsit + δct + µi + εit (1.2)
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on all non-group (group aliated) rms with parent shareholder. TreatSample is a binary
dummy variable. It equals to 1 if the rm indirectly joins (leaves) the group in the following
year, and 0 otherwise. The coecient of TreatSample captures the dierence between
the treatment sample and control sample ex-ante. I focus on the dierence in revenue,
protability, sales growth, total asset growth and number of employees.
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 report the estimation results for non-group rms with corporate
shareholder(s) and group aliated rms respectively. Through the two tables, TreatSample
dummy is insignicant. That is to say, controlling for rms' observable characteristics, rms
unintentionally joining (leaving) business groups are similar to other non-group (group) rms
with parent shareholder ex-ante.
The second set of tests provides evidence to falsify the counter-argument of the uninten-
tional assumption. In particular, I check whether the group aliation (detachment) eect
varies by the importance of new rms. If the unintentional group change is endogenous,
subsidiary new rms would aect acquisition decision of the parent rms, even after control-
ling for observable characteristics. The more important of the new rm, the higher weight
it takes. Therefore, the group aliation (detachment) eect should be stronger for more
important new rms.
I use two measures to capture the importance: the relative size of a new rm to the
group, and the average relative size to its parent group shareholders. I use total assets as
the proxy for size. I introduce a binary dummy variable to indicate whether the relative size
is higher than the median level (taking value 1) or not (taking value 0). Then I include the
cross term between GroupDummy and the dummy into the regression. The coecient of
this cross term indicates additional group aliation (detachment) eect for important new
rms.
Table 3.8 shows that group aliation eect, rather strengthens, actually weakens for more
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important rm. Panel A shows that new rms are small relative to the forthcoming business
groups and rst layer parent shareholder. The average relative size to the group is 11.41%
and the median level is 6%. The average relative size to the rst layer parent shareholders
is 25.9% and the median level is 17%. Panel B indicates that the group aliation eect
is almost completely driven by less important rms. For a new rm indirectly joining a
group, protability may increase by up to 0.041 (25.07%) if its relative size to the group is
lower than sample median. While there is barely no eect on the protability for rms with
relative size higher than median. Similar pattern exists when the relative size to the parent
shareholders are used.
Regarding to the group detachment, Table 3.9 shows that the insignicant eect does
not vary by the relative importance of new rms. Again, this may be attributed to the fewer
observations in the sample.
Results in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 contradict the endogeneity argument. Unreported
tables deliver similar results when revenue is used as the proxy for size. They all indicate
that unintentional changing group status satisfy the identication assumption. The quasi-
experimental setting is valid to establish causal link.
Since group detachment has an insignicant eect, following discussions would focus on
group aliation eect. Results of group detachment are available upon request.
1.5 Mechanisms
In this section, I present two major mechanisms contributing to the the increase in prof-
itability: revenue increase and market share expansion; and labor quality improvement.
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1.5.1 Revenue increase and market share expansion
Within the short period after joining business groups, the most signicant change is the
fast growth in revenue. This growth is mainly driven by the quantity instead of the pricing
power, evidenced by the expansion in market share and unchanged gross prot margin.
Table 3.10 presents the change of revenue (scaled by the lagged total assets), gross prot
margin, gross prot (scaled by the lagged total asset) and the market share upon group
aliation. The rst two columns show that scaled revenue increases by 5%. Since there is
insignicant change in the gross prot margin, as the next two columns show, the increase
in revenue almost completely translates to the increase in gross prot (5.4%), evidenced by
the signicant magnitude in the fth and sixth column. The 5.4% increase in gross prot
margin accounts for 44% of the increase in protability documented earlier. In the last two
columns, I checked the market share of new rms, which is the new rm's revenue relative
to the total revenue generated in the same country, year and industry. Results show that on
average new rm's market increase by 14%.
If the new rm leverage on the marketing network of the business group, aliation with
a more powerful group would strengthen the above eects. This is in the same spirit of
Hochberg et al. (2007)'s nding about VC rms. Table 3.11 investigate this projection by
introducing the group's market share. It is calculated as the sum of revenue generated by
group members in the same country and industry, over the total revenue in the respective
country and industry. Panel A reports the summary statistics of the group market share. On
average, the business group has a market share nine times of the new rm. Specications in
Panel B add an interaction term between the GroupDummy and a dummy variable in the
specication. The dummy variable indicate whether the group's market share lies in the top
quartile. Results show that joining a group with a top quartile market share would double
the group aliation eect on the revenue, gross prot and the market share.
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Given that revenue growth is the rst order eect of group aliation, we would expect the
increase in protability is more signicant in a revenue oriented sector. Table 3.10 Column
V conrms this projection by focusing on retail and wholesale trade industry. Compared to
results in Table 3.4 Panel A, the magnitudes of group aliation eect are 60% higher across
specications.
1.5.2 Labor quality improves
Another important mechanism is that new rms' labor quality improves upon group alia-
tion. It is reected in both the top manager level and average employee level.
Top manager turnover and increase in experience
Results in this section show that joining a business group triggers a greater chance of man-
agement turnover; a large portion of new top managers comes from other group members;
and on average managers become more experienced afterward.
Table 3.12 presents the cumulative top manager turnover ratio up to three years after
joining business groups. Panel A shows results for unintentional group aliation. One
year after unintentionally joining groups, 13.25% of rms experience at least one manager
turnover. The ratio doubles the sample average (5.76%) and further increases to 19.56%
within three years after joining business groups. The cumulative percentage of new managers
displays a similar patter, gradually increasing from 9.30% to 14.69% within the three years.
It is noteworthy that business group consistently supply a great portion of new managers.
More than 28% of new managers are from other rms within the same business group. This
ratio is stable regardless of the year turnover happened.
Results in Panel A carry over to Panel B where joining a group is either unintentional or
not. Compared to rms directly acquired by business groups, rms unintentionally joining
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a group may be less visible to group owners. Therefore, explicit reforms, such as manager
turnover, may lag behind and occur less frequently. Consistent with the intuition, magnitudes
are bigger across dierent measures in Panel B. Again, business groups are an important
source of new managers.
The dierence-in-dierences results in Table 3.13 shows that there are signicant changes
of new manager ratio and average management experience, compared to the control sample.
Matching criteria are same as those used in Table 3.3. Panel A conrms that proportion
of new managers signicantly increase by 0.022 (53.1% of sample mean) after joining a
business group. Panel B investigate the average manager experience, which is measured as
the total tenure as top managers across all of the positions. Average change of experience is
about three years higher (26.1% of sample mean) compared to the control sample. Panel C
focuses on the experience within the same industry. The change of 2.979 years is still both
statistically signicant and economically signicant (27.7% of sample mean).
Results in Table 3.14 conrm the above ndings in a regression setting. To capture any
lagged turnover after the event year, I use cumulative number of new managers. The rst
two columns show that group aliations leads to more than 0.082 (58% of sample mean)
increase in this number. It suggest that there are signicant turnovers triggered by group
aliation. The following four columns investigate top manager experience. On average,
manager's total tenure increases by 2.2 years (24.2% of sample mean), and same-industry
tenure increases by 2 years (24.2% of sample mean).
More productive employees
Besides the top manager, another part of the labor force is other employees. Active mon-
itoring from business groups may also involve replacements of underperformed employees,
more professional training, and more eective incentive package. Although I do not directly
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observe this change, I investigate the realized productivity of employees, measured by rev-
enue generated per employee, prot generated per employee, and the logarithm of marginal
productivity of labor as (Larrain and Stumpner, 2013) for manufacturing rms.17
Table 3.15 shows that the average productivity of employees signicantly increases across
three measures. Compared to the sample average, revenue generated per employee increases
by 13%, prot generated per employee increases by 17%, and marginal productivity of labor
increases by 7% in the manufacturing sector.
To better understand the change, I further investigate another three labor related mea-
sures in Table 3.16: number of employees, average yearly wage, and ratio of wage expense
against total revenue. Results show that group aliation leads to slightly more employment
and higher wage per person. Also, more revenue are generate by per dollar of wage. Results
in Table 3.15 and Table 3.16 signal a more eective incentive pay: on average employees get
higher wage, while they are better motivated to generate even higher revenue and deliver a
higher prot.
1.6 Robustness Check
My major results about protability in previous section are robust to alternative sample
compositions, alternative group measures (denitions), estimation horizon, industry trends,
alternative protability measure, and other concerns.
17It is inappropriate to model productivity based on neoclassical production function outside manufactur-
ing sector.
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1.6.1 Robust to the sample composition and survival bias
One concern is that above results may be based on a biased sample. Generally there are
three potential channels contributing to this bias. First, ling criteria vary by countries and
time. Under-performed rms may drop o from the sample due to more stringent criteria.
Second, data providers in dierent countries may have agency problem in collecting rms'
lings. If it requires more eort to collect information of under-performed rms, better-
performed rms are more likely to be included. This concern is severer when ling is not
obligatory. Third, if rms ever change group status have a higher failure rate during the rst
six years, the remaining treatment sample would come from the upper tail of the population
distribution of all rms. Thus, long-lived rms occupy the sample.
To address the rst two concerns, I rst exclude countries ever change ling criteria
(Switzerland, Italy) during the sample period, and report the results in Table A.4. Then I
only focus on countries where all public and private limited companies are required to le
statement (exclude Bulgaria, Finland, and Poland). Results are reported in Table A.5. In
both tables, group aliation eects are similar to the results based on the whole sample. In
unreported tables, I repeat estimations by excluding one country each time and nd similar
results.
The third issue has already been partially addressed, as regressions based only on rms
ever change group status generate similar results. To directly investigate it, I check the
survival duration of all three samples: always group rms, always non-group rms, and
rms ever change group status. I nd no signicant dierence in the survival probability
among these three sub-samples.
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1.6.2 Robust to alternative group measure and denitions
Through out the chapter, I use a binary dummy variable indicating group aliation. This
only picks up the average homogenous group eect, regardless of the bonding strength among
group members. In this section, I show that since new rms are closely owned by groups,
using binary dummy is appropriate. The same set of test also shows that results are robust
to alternative group denitions.
I ran three sets of tests in total. First, I nd results are not sensitive to the number of
group members. Second, I replace theGroupDummy with the total group stakesGroupTotal
(between 0.3 and 1) in the specication 1.1. Table 3.17, Panel A reports the summary
statistics of the group stake, and Panel B presents results of regressions. The total group
stake is highly skewed to 1 when new rms belong to groups. Therefore the continuous
measure deliver a similar results as the binary dummy. Third, I change the ownership stake
cuto value α from 15% to 50% and construct business groups respectively. Table 3.18
presents the result and shows robust results across dierent denitions. Again, this is due
to the high total group stakes in the new rm. Therefore a small cuto value of α is not
binding for most of the new rms.
1.6.3 Group aliation eect is beyond the event year
Another concern is that the protability measure may be tarnished around the group status
change. On the one hand, acquisition of parent shareholders may be associated with recog-
nition or write-o of total assets. The denominator of my protability measure may change
due to its parent shareholder's ownership change. On the other hand, private rms prot
may suer from manipulation. To address this concern, I did two sets of tests.
First, I carry out an event study around group status change. In Table 3.19, I replace the
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GroupDummy with dummies indicating the year since rms unintentionally join business
groups. Because in total up to ve year observations are available, four dummies are gener-
ated indicating the event year to three years after group aliation (t+3). Not only dummies
indicating the event years are signicant, but also dummies indicating further years after the
aliation. Results show that group aliation eect is not restricted to the event year, but
extends to two years after.
Second, in unreported results, I exclude event year observations from the regressions and
still nd a signicant group aliation eect.
1.6.4 Robust to industry trends
In the specication 1.1, the country by year xed eects should absorb any policy variations
and trends at the country level. To further control variations in the industry level, I replace
it with country-industry-year xed eects, and report the results in Table 3.20. Magnitudes
of group aliation eects are similar to those in Table 3.20.
1.6.5 Other robustness check
I would describe other robustness check I did. Firstly, I use an alternative measure of prof-
itability, EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) scaled by lagged total assets, and reports
the result in Table 3.21. Second, I only keep rms with at least three-year consecutive ob-
servations in the sample. Third, I add parent shareholder characteristics as control variables
in the specications. Results are robust across dierent specications.
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1.7 Conclusion
Motivated by the widespread role of business groups in sponsoring new rms, this chapter
aims to establish causal link between group aliation and new rms' protability. Using
a comprehensive database of nancial and ownership information for rms in 24 European
countries, I nd that group aliation leads to 12% increase in the protability, based on
a quasi-experimental setting where rms change group status unintentionally. Further in-
vestigations show two major mechanisms contributing to the improvement in protability.
Possibly leveraging the marketing networks of group members, new rms quickly expand
revenue and market share in the industry. They also gain more experienced managers and
productive employees upon joining groups.
Results of this chapter suggest that business groups parallel the role of venture capital
rms in sponsoring new rms in Europe. Business groups not only provide nancing by
directly investing in new rms, but also cultivating the new rms by sharing operation
synergy and promoting labor force productivity. The results are consistent with a Coasian
view on rm organization form. As mentioned in Morck (2003),in an economy with weak
institutional support for markets, business groups may be desirable as an optimal `second
best' approach to organizing economic activity in the sense of Coase (1937) and Williamson
(1973).
Consistent with this view, my ndings shed light on the lagged development of VC in
Europe (Hall and Lerner, 2010). Due to less maturity and a smaller network, European VCs
are thought to provide limited benet to new rms. Raising the âabilityâ (Bottazzi
and Da Rin, 2002) or power of VCs might be urgently needed. Meanwhile, it is an open
question whether VCs or group aliation are a better instrument to foster growth of new
rms.
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The results in this chapter may also suggest a positive role of conglomerates in cultivating
new rms. As the counterpart of business groups in the U.S., conglomerates consist of fully
owned subsidiaries instead of legally independent rms. Public information of subsidiaries is
not widely available, and as a result there is limited research on the subsidiary level. Although
the dierences in legal status may lead to dierent aliation eects in other dimensions,18
the independent status is not crucial in this chapter. In fact, since new rms are closely
owned by the group members, the positive eect of group aliation is expected to carry
forward to new rms in conglomerates.
For future research, an interesting starting point is to study the incentive and eect of
group aliation from the perspective of business groups. Black and Gilson (1998) attributes
the success of venture capital in US to the implicit contract over future control, that is
permitted by the availability of exit through an IPO. Compared to its counterpart in the
U.S., venture capital is much less active in Europe (Hall and Lerner, 2010). There are
also less IPO opportunities in Europe. Results in this chapter show that entrepreneurs may
benet from group aliation other than IPO. Further investigation may focus on the implicit
contract between business groups and entrepreneurs.
18e.g. Belenzon and Berkovitz (2010) document a positive eect of group aliation on innovation, while
Seru (2014) nds that conglomerates stie innovation.
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Competition and Private Benets of
Control
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2.1 Introduction
A widespread view in nance and economics is that competition improves eciency. Yet,
this disciplining force is often overlooked in the corporate governance literature.1 A common
argument for the importance of competition is natural selection. Competition, it is argued,
would tend to drive inecient rms out of the market (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958). This
threat, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), is probably the most powerful force towards
economic eciency in the world. While these arguments are appealing, the theoretical
foundations for the link between competition and corporate governance have been dicult
to establish.2 For example, in their seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that
rms would tend to face identical agency costs irrespective of competitive pressures in the
market place.
Empirically, it has also been challenging to document the impact of competition because
both the intensity of competition and the quality of governance arrangements are dicult
to measure. Endogenously determined industry characteristics, such as concentration ratios
may result from intensive competitive pressures rather than from competitive slack (Demsetz,
1973; Baumol, 1982). Consistent with this concern, recent industry trends provide stark
examples where concentration-based indexes, such as the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),
do not reect the intensity of competition in the cross-section or over time.3 As a result,
these indexes are dicult to interpret as direct measures of competition (Demsetz, 1973;
1See Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Becht et al. (2003). Notable exceptions include Morck et al. (1998),
Dyck and Zingales (2004), and, more recently, Giroud and Mueller (2010).
2See Scharfstein (1988); Holmstrom and Tirole (1989); Hermalin (1992); Raith (2003); among others.
3For example, the general merchandise industry is highly concentrated around industry leaders, such
as Wal-Mart and Target, and at the same time extremely competitive. Similarly, the textile products
industry has more than doubled its HHI index in the last decade, while the industry has faced one of




In this chapter, we test for the eect of competition on governance using variation from
two internationally comparable indexes of product and input market regulation developed by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The product market
regulation (PMR) index tracks formal barriers to entrepreneurship, restrictions to foreign
trade and investment, and direct state control of business activities at the country level
(Conway et al., 2005). Product market regulations are the most direct restrictions aecting
the extent to which a market is contestable (Baumol, 1982).
The regulatory impact (RI) index captures government restrictions aecting input mar-
kets. The focus on input regulations is a generalization of Rajan and Zingales (1998)'s idea
that inputs are crucial catalysts for the process of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934).
Intuitively, if input markets are subject to sharp regulatory barriers, competitive forces
would tend to be weaker. Moreover, recent studies have shown a direct link between input
deregulation and competition.4 The four key inputs that the RI index tracks are: nancial
services, energy, transport and communications, and retail distribution. The restrictions
include entry regulations, licenses, ownership barriers, pricing controls and quotas. The RI
index weights input regulations by its input share per industry. As such, each industry has
its own time-varying index.
We investigate the impact of competition on one measure of private benets of control
(PBC): the voting premium between shares with dierential voting rights. The relative
price of these dual-class shares has been widely used as a measure of the PBC enjoyed
by controlling shareholders.5 The logic for using this measure is that beyond the common
4See for example, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006); Bertrand et al. (2007); Francois and Wooton (2008).
5Lease et al. (1983); DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985); Barkalay and Holderness (1989); Zingales (1994,
1995); Nenova (2003); Doidge (2004).
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cash-ow rights, higher voting shares confer the ability to aect control contests. If control
is valuable, the voting premium could be used to estimate the value of private benets of
control (Zingales, 1995).6 Furthermore, the fact that the voting premium varies over time
within rms allows us to control for rm unobserved heterogeneity.
To test for the eect of competition on the voting premium, we use data on dual-class
rms from DATASTREAM, with matching competition information from the OECD. To
identify dual-class rms, we follow Doidge (2004) in selecting rms with dual-class structures,
between 1990 and 2008. On the whole, we use information on 866 dual-class rms in 16
countries.
Our empirical strategy has three important advantages relative to pre-existing studies
linking competition and governance outcomes. First, it focuses on the key articial impedi-
ments to competition that result from government regulation (Baumol, 1982). Second, these
regulations follow government actions, which are more likely to be exogenous to individual
rm decision-making, facilitating inference. Third, these regulations, along with the voting
premium, vary over time, allowing us to provide sharper tests of the eects of competition
on governance.7
Using these measures and data, we test for two crucial predictions of competition as a
disciplinary force in the market (Stigler, 1963):
First, we assess whether competition reduces the level of ineciency inside organiza-
tions. If competition were to improve governance outcomes, we would expect that increasing
competition would lead to lower private benets of control. In other words, with intense
6The value of a vote is also aected by the probability that a vote is marginal in a control contest. In
the absence of adequate data to control for such probabilities, the bulk of the tests in this chapter examine
within-rm changes in the voting premium, implicitly assuming that those probabilities are held constant.
7Pre-existing studies rely on time-invariant measures of competition, such as cross-country (Dyck and
Zingales, 2004) or industry-wide measures (Giroud and Mueller, 2010).
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competition the ability of insiders to redirect corporate resources (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Zwiebel, 1995) and use inside information for personal gain (Dyck and Zingales, 2004)
would decline. In consequence, if private benets decline, we would expect the estimated
voting premium to fall as competition increases.
Second, we investigate whether higher levels of competition lead to changes in the disper-
sion in the voting premia within countries and industries. A growing literature in economics
has emphasized the importance of competition for explaining the degree of within industry
dispersion in productivity (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Syverson, 2004a,b). Moreover, dis-
persion in outcomes is often identied as an important puzzle in organizational economics
(Gibbons and Henderson, 2011). Competition may aect the level of dispersion in private
benets by disciplining incumbent rms or by forcing them to exit. Interestingly, the eect of
competition on the dispersion of governance outcomes has not been studied in the literature.
As a result this chapter provides, to the best of our knowledge, the rst direct test linking
competition and the dispersion of governance outcomes.
The main ndings of the chapter are three.
First, higher levels of competition are correlated with statistically and economically lower
estimates of private benets of control. This result holds across countries, but most impor-
tantly, within countries, and holding other country variables constant. The economic mag-
nitude of these estimates is substantial. For example, moving from Italy's level of product
market competition to France's level in 2003 would lead to a reduction of 0.26 in the voting
premium, or 31 percent of the standard deviation of private benets.
Second, competition is crucial to understanding the dispersion in the estimated private
benets of control. Using quantile regressions, we rst document that more than half of the
overall dispersion in the voting premium is within country - i.e. not explained by country-
or industry- xed eects. More revealing, we nd striking evidence that competition signi-
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cantly reduces the dispersion of private benets, in particular, by reducing private benets
in the top quantiles of the PBC distribution.
Third, we exploit the panel dimension of the data to show that changes in the intensity
of competition lead to lower estimates of private benets of control, not only across countries
and industries but also within rms. In terms of inference, this result is important because
it provides the rst direct test to date that changes in competition reduce the level of private
benets of control within rms.8 This result implies that for PBC, rm turnover is not
the only driver of eciency following deregulation events, but rather that product market
competition leads to a signicant disciplinary eect on incumbent rms.
We also show that the negative relationship between competition and PBC is signicantly
larger in countries with weaker rule-of-law environments. That the average PBC estimate
is lower for rms in high rule-of-law countries is not surprising given the existing literature
(Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Doidge, 2004). The fact that, conditional on a
weak legal environment, competition is strongly correlated with lower PBC suggests that,
competition can potentially reduce insiders' wasteful behavior. More broadly, the chapter
contributes to the growing literature that seeks to understand the dispersion in the quality of
governance, holding legal origin constant (La Porta et al., 1998). Previous studies have em-
phasized the importance of cross-listing for governance and rm outcomes (Coee Jr (1998);
Stulz (1999); Reese and Weisbach (2002); Doidge (2004); Hail and Leuz (2009), among oth-
ers); the relevance of independent directors (Dahya et al., 2008), or foreign institutional
investors (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2011), among other forces.
Taken together, the evidence highlights the importance of competition for the allocation
of resources. The results provide empirical support for the idea that competition is a unique
8The closest related study is Giroud and Mueller (2010), which examines the eect of changes in the
external governance environment (not changes in the intensity of competition), for rms in industries with
high and low levels of industry concentration.
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disciplinary force in the economy and one that has received scant attention in the gover-
nance literature. The focus on the dispersion of governance emphasizes that learning about
the entire distribution of governance characteristics may be important both to unveil new
empirical results and to provide sharper tests for existing theories linking competition and
governance.
2.2 Empirical Strategy and Predictions
In this section, we briey outline the main empirical specications used and describe the main
hypotheses linking competition and the level and dispersion of private benets of control.
2.2.1 The Eect of Competition on the Level of Private Benets of
Control
The main challenge in testing for the eect of competition on governance is nding proxies
for competition that are both conceptually relevant, and that vary over time.
Since Demsetz (1973), it has been widely understood that outcome measures of com-
petition, such as concentration indexes, are dicult to interpret as measures of competition.
In the absence of barriers to entry, concentration of an industry's output in a few rms
could only derive from their superiority in producing and marketing products.9 Subsequent
analysis has further echoed this critique (e.g. see Baumol (1982); Schmalensee (2007)). For
example, the main conclusions of the contestable markets theory of competition are two.
First, high concentration indexes may be signs of virtue, not of vice in a market. Second,
articial impediments to entry, such as those arising from government restrictions, are un-
9Demsetz (1973), p. 1.
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desirable.10 The corollary of these ideas is the analysis of competition should emphasize the
actual barriers limiting entry and competition.
Recent studies provide empirical support to the idea that competition may be a crucial
force in corporate governance. Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that country-level measures
of product market competition are negatively correlated with the prices paid for control-
ling blocks, a common proxy for private benets of control. Similarly, Giroud and Mueller
(2010) document that industry-level competition may keep managers incentivized even after
the passage of anti-takeover legislation. Specically, they nd that regulations that make
takeovers dicult lead to higher costs, but only in concentrated industries. These studies,
however, rely on measures of competition that are either endogenous or that do not change
over time. As a result, they do not provide direct tests for the eect of changing competition
on private benets of control.
Dyck and Zingales (2004) use a survey-based measure of the level of competition across
countries. Survey tools are attractive in that they can potentially assess the combined eect
of regulations aecting entrants and antitrust policy constraining incumbents. Yet, they
are based on subjective evaluations rather than objective measures of competition policy.
Furthermore, in Dyck and Zingales (2004) the competition variable used does not vary
over time. As a result, other cross-country variables may complicate inference. Similarly,
the measure of PBC used in the chapterthe price paid for controlling blocksis based on
transactions that rarely occur more than once for a given rm. In consequence, the nature
of such data makes it dicult to evaluate the within-rm eect of competition on the level
of PBC.
Giroud and Mueller (2010) proxy competition using the Herndahl-Hirschman index
(HHI) of concentration across industries. As previously argued, the HHI index has important
10Baumol (1982), p. 14.
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limitations as a measure of competition. Furthermore, the HHI index used in that paper
is time-invariant. As a result, it is dicult to assess if the results reported capture the
direct eect of competition or confounding eects that make optimal rm size relatively
large. Finally, Giroud and Mueller (2010) do not directly test for the eect of changes in
competition on their measures of managerial slack since the main focus of the study is on
measuring the eects of changes in anti-takeover legislation on governance.
In this chapter, we focus on measures of the intensity of competition that are based on
actual government regulations aecting product and input markets as motivated by theory.
More specically, we start by estimating the following specication:
PBCist = α + βCompst +X
′
istϑ+ dc + dt + εist (2.1)
where PBCist are private benets of control for rm i, in industry s at time t, and Compst
is a proxy for competition at a given industry s and year t, and the variation in this variable
reects government restrictions to competition (the lower the restrictions, the higher the
competition index). If competition disciplines rms, we expect to be negative and signicant.
Country dummies dc control for any permanent dierences across countries that may
aect the level of PBC. Time dummies or dt are included to control for aggregate time
trends. X ′ist is a vector of rm-level characteristics and country-level controls. The rm-
level variables control for a set of rm characteristics, including rm size (ln of rm assets),
growth opportunities (market to book ratio), and protability (net income to sales). We also
include two variables that may aect the voting premium directly: a measure of the relative
liquidity of the high and low voting shares (measured as the ratio of the total number of
rms traded in a year of each type of share); and the ratio of the dividends per share of the
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high relative to the low voting rights security.11 We will also allow for a set of variables to
control for possible omitted time-varying country characteristics (GDP growth, the ratio of
the market capitalization of traded securities to GDP, the ratio of foreign direct investment
(FDI) to GDP, and unemployment). The potential cost of using these controls is that
if time-varying rm and country controls are endogenous to changes in competition, then
we cannot separately identify their impact on PBC. We do not include those time-varying
characteristics in the main and preferred specications. Yet, we show the robustness of the
results to the inclusion of those variables.
It is well known that countries dier systematically in an array of ways, and country
variation tends to be very important empirically (Doidge et al., 2007). La Porta et al.
(1998), for example, documents important correlations between the degree of investors' legal
protection and measures of corporate governance. Roe (2003), however, argues that such
cross-country correlations may be driven by other non-legal institutions, such as, product
market competition. The use of country xed-eects allows us to empirically investigate
whether competition aects the level and dispersion of private benets of control, holding
country-characteristics, such as their legal origin, antitrust laws or other important variables,
constant.
Finally, to the extent that competition variables are measured imprecisely, the reported
estimates are likely to suer from attenuation bias.
11Since these control variables are not available for all rms in the sample, we imputed a value of zero to
the missing observations and also included dummies for each variable that equals one if the observation had
been imputed. In this way, we do not lose observations, but can include the controls. The results are similar
if we do not impute the missing observations.
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2.2.2 Competition and the Dispersion of Private Benets of Con-
trol: Quantile Regressions
The eect of competition on the dispersion in governance has, thus far, remained unexplored
in the literature. Such an omission is surprising for a number of reasons. First, if competition
were to indeed discipline insiders, it would necessarily put a lower bound on the level of
ineciency (Stigler, 1963). Second, a number of recent studies have indeed shown that
competition leads to lower dispersion in output. Syverson (2004a,b), for example, shows a
wide dispersion in total factor productivity levels, particularly in less competitive markets.
Third, and more generally, the focus on the entire distribution of private benetsnot only
its meanallows the econometrician to potentially uncover new facts and to provide sharper
tests of alternative theories of competition and private benets of control.12
We test for the eect of competition on the dispersion of private benets of control using
quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1978; Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Quantile
regressions are commonly used to characterize the entire conditional distribution of a depen-
dent variable given a set of exogenous variables or, alternatively, as robustness tests. In the
nance literature, however, its use is typically restricted to outlier tests.13
We use quantile regressions to investigate whether increases in the intensity of competi-
tion aect the level of private benets dierently for lower or upper quantiles of the PBC
distribution, holding other covariates constant. As a result, we can determine (a) if disper-
sion is changing as the result of competition, and (b) which specic quantiles are driving
12The focus on the entire empirical distributions has grown over time in several elds of economics. In
labor economics, for example, the focus on dispersion has been shown to be crucial in understanding the
structure of wages (Chamberlain, 1994) or the evolution of income inequality (Piketty and Saez, 2003). For
example, mean time series analysis fails to capture the drastic increase in inequality in the last 30 years:
average incomes have remained virtually unchanged in the U.S. while the income shares of the top one
percent of earners have increased dramatically (Piketty and Saez, 2003).
13See, for example, Gompers et al. (2003) and Almeida et al. (2004).
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the changes in dispersion (i.e. higher or lower quantiles). This is in contrast to an ordinary
least squares regression (OLS) that solely provides information on the eect of competition
on the average level of private benets. Formally, we estimate quantile regressions, at the
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles (Q) of the PBC distribution:
PBCist = α






s + εist (2.2)
The coecients βQ for each of the selected quantiles tell us the extent to which PBC
changes with competition at each selected quantile Q. Therefore, by comparing the dierence
between these estimates, we can assess how the dispersion of private benets changes with
competition. For example, βQ=90−βQ=10 measures the extent to which the distance between
the 90th and the 10th percentiles of PBC changes with higher competition. If competition
has a larger negative eect at the 90th than at the 10th quantile, we would expect this dier-
ence to be negative: the larger the gap, the larger the decline in dispersion as competition
increases. Finally, to test for statistical signicance of these eects, we use simultaneous
quantile regressions and bootstrap standard errors (with 500 repetitions of the bootstrap at
each percentile).
In terms of predictions, we expect that higher levels of competition would lead to signif-
icant reductions in the dispersion of PBC. That is, the eect of competition should be more
(less) pronounced for the upper (lower) quantiles of the PBC distribution.
2.2.3 Competition and Private Benets of Control. Firm-level Anal-
ysis Using Panel Data
To provide a sharper test for the eect of competition on governance, we use the panel
structure of the data to assess whether changes in competition lead to lower estimates of
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private benets of control within rms. Within-rm tests also help in disentangling the
selection and disciplinary eects of competition.14 Competition can lead to lower PBC by
forcing inecient rms out of the market or by inducing existing rms to operate more
eciently. The existing total factor productivity literature suggests that both eects may
be important. Foster et al. (2006), for example, document that productivity gains may be
solely explained by entry and exit decisions. Schmitz Jr (2005), in contrast, documents large
within-rm productivity gains in response to higher competitive pressures.
Formally, we evaluate the following specication:
PBCist = α + βCompst +X
′
istϑ+ di + dt + εist (2.3)
where (di) are rm xed-eects and the rest of the variables are dened as in 2.1 and 2.2
above. In 2.3, we expect β to be negative and signicant.
In sum, this section highlights the main departures of this chapter relative to the extant
literature. The chapter provides the rst empirical tests linking the key structural parameters
aecting competition and governance outcomes. It also presents the rst tests of the eects
of competition on the entire distribution of private benets of control. We currently know
little about the dispersion in governance outcomes and its determinants, and this chapter
provides an attractive setting to assess these issues. Last but not least, the chapter provides
the rst arguably causal tests on the eect of changes in competition on governance variables.
In the following section, we describe the data and the key variables of interest.
14The use of within-country or industry variation in competition allows us to rule out the confounding
eect of time-invariant country, industry or rm characteristics, which is a concern in the existing literature.
Prominent cross-sectional results, such as those in the ownership concentration literature (Morck et al., 1998)
disappear when analyzing rm xed-eects specications (Himmelberg et al., 1999).
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2.3 Private Benets and Competition: Data Description
2.3.1 Dual-Class Share Firms and Estimates of Private Benets of
Control (PBC)
Following Zingales (1995) and Doidge (2004), we estimate PBC using the voting premia
between dual-class shares, adjusting for the relative voting power of securities:
PBC =
PH − PL
PL − rv ∗ PH
(2.4)
ï­
Where PH is the price of a high voting-right share, PL is the price of a low voting-right
share, and rvis the relative number of votes of the low voting-rights share compared to the




Using the ratio of dual-class securities as a measure of private benets has both advan-
tages and disadvantages. The voting premium is appealing because it is based on security
prices that reect investors' valuations for being in control, which are related to PBC. It is a
useful way to measure phenomena that are usually unobservable. Additionally, if both high-
and low-voting securities are entitled to the same cash ow rights, estimates in this ratio will
not be aected by changes in expected distributions: i.e. they will only capture the value of
the dierential voting rights. Lastly, we can estimate this ratio at dierent points in time,
which allows us to focus on within-rm analysis. In terms of inference, xed-eects models
help in ruling out the eect of time-invariant rm, industry and country characteristics on
the results.
A drawback of the dual-shares methodology to estimate PBC is that it is only available
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for rms that have self selected into the pool of rms with two or more classes of shares, a
decision that is likely to be correlated with high PBC to begin with.15 Furthermore, dual-
class shares are prohibited in some countries (e.g., Japan), which prevents us from estimating
PBC in those settings. An added shortcoming is that the ratio above requires both classes
of shares to be traded. These concerns may limit the relevance of the results to non-sample
rms.
Potentially more challenging for the tests, the voting premia may vary over time, even
when the true private benets are held constant. Time-varying voting premia can reect
that dual-class shares, for example, may not be identical in terms of their cash-ow or other
characteristics, and these traits may evolve over time. To address such concerns, we limit
the analysis to rms in which cash-ow distributions are linked across shares, and in the
empirical specications, we include controls for these variables. Alternatively, the estimated
voting ratio may vary over time as a function of changes in the probability of control contests
(Zingales, 1995). As earlier papers that have used this variable (e.g., Doidge (2004)), we have
no information on the ownership structure of the rms in the sample. However, the fact that
in contrast with earlier workwe are able to introduce rm xed-eects allows us to control
for the probability of having a pivotal vote, provided that this probability is constant over
time. In addition, to control for the possibility that the probability of control contests varies
over time, in some specications we introduce time varying controls for the level of foreign
direct investment and the value of the market capitalization of local rms, variables that
are likely to be correlated with such events. To identify rms with dual-class shares that
are less exposed to the concerns outlined above, we follow Doidge (2004) in including all
15Similarly, other measures of PBC such as those based on acquisitions of controlling interests (Barkalay
and Holderness, 1989; Dyck and Zingales, 2004), share similar concerns as they are only available for rms
that are the target of acquisitions, which are also non-random. In particular, they are likely to be less
successful or ecient than their bidders.
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DATASTREAM rms that meet the following criteria: (1) They have at least two types
of shares with dierential voting rights; (2) individual securities must be publicly traded
and listed on a domestic exchange. The price of shares listed in dierent markets may vary
as a function of local market conditions (Rosenthal and Young, 1990); (3) the low-voting
class security is not convertible into the high-voting share; and (4) neither share receives
a xed dividend independent of the other class. In addition, we use Mergent Online and
the Securities and Exchange Commission's Edgar resource to assess which rms meet (1)
to (4) above. We obtain stock price information from DATASTREAM. To be included in
the sample, we require rms to have security price information for both shares for at least
15 days per year.16 In order to minimize the impact of outliers, we focus on securities with
trading prices of at least one half of a unit of the local currency and we winsorize the data at
the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution. We also require that the relative dividend
distributions to high- and low-voting securities are within the 1st and 99th percentiles. The
measure of PBC is, then, the median voting premium for the year. We retain those with
at least one matching competition measure from the OECD. As a result, the nal sample
includes 866 rms and 7219 rm-year observations in 16 countries.17
Table 3.22 presents the summary statistics. The average estimated voting premium is
0.319, while the sample median is 0.053. The average (median), high-voting shares have
5.116 (1) votes. In contrast, the average (median) number of votes per low-voting share is
0.222 (0) votes. The average (median) ratio of votes for low-to-high voting securities (rv
in equation 2.4) is 0.035 (0), indicating that most rm pairings match a non-voting with
a voting share. Similarly, the relative vote-per-dollar-of-dividend has an average (median)
16The results are not sensitive to this sampling requirement.
17The dierence between 22 and 16 countries is explained by Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, South Africa
and Venezuela, which are not OECD members.
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value of 5.229 (0.997). Both statistics are consistent with the sample selection criteria in
Doidge (2004), where rms are included as long as they have dierential voting rights, and
their dividends rights are not independent from each other.
A potential drawback of requiring matching dual-class and competition information is
that the rms in the sample may not be representative of the average of dual-class share
rms. In Table 3.23, we report the mean voting premium by country from the sample
rms (Column II), for rms that meet all the screening tests other than having matching
competition information from the OECD (Column IV) and for the rms included in Doidge
(2004) (Column V). We obtain other security-level information, such as volume and dividends
from DATASTREAM. We use MERGENT Online and web searches to obtain industry
classications under the Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) system. We use other
country-level variables that vary over time, such as GDP growth, the ratio of the market
capitalization of traded securities to GDP, the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to
GDP, and unemployment numbers, all from theWorld Bank's World Development Indicators.
Finally, we obtain several variables on the quality of the legal institutions from La Porta
et al. (1998), such as the rule of law, accounting standards and anti-director rights indexes.
2.3.2 Measuring the Intensity of Competition: Regulation of Prod-
uct and Input Markets
To capture the eect of competition on the voting premia, we use the product market
regulation (PMR) and the regulatory impact (RI) indexes developed by the OECD (see
Conway et al. (2005), and Conway et al. (2006), respectively for details).
The product market regulation index (PMR) measures the level of countrywide product
market regulations in the nal-goods markets. This index summarizes information on 139
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specic regulations that impose: (a) barriers to entrepreneurship (administrative burdens,
permits, licenses and fees, etc), (b) restrictions to foreign trade and investment (taris,
quotas, ownership and investment restrictions, etc) and (c) direct state control of business
activities (price controls, public ownership, and other command and control provisions).
The index is comparable across countries and has a scale of 0 to 6, where 0 (6) is the most
(least) competitive. The index is available for 1998, 2003, and 2008 and its variation reects
changes in the underlying government restrictions, the classic and fundamental parameter
of competition. As a result, it is ideally suited to evaluate the eect of product market
competition on the voting premia.
Given that we are interested in the eect of competition on the voting premium, we
dene the variables product and input market competition indexes as the negative of the
PMR and RI indexes, respectively. As a result, higher values of these product and input
competition indexes correspond to fewer regulations and higher levels of competition.
Table 3.22 shows that the average product market regulation (PMR) index is -1.61.
Since the index was introduced in 1998, countries such as the United Kingdom (U.K.),
Australia, and the United States, exhibit relatively few market restrictions while countries
such as Greece and Italy, display signicant burdens to competition. Interestingly, while
comparable institutional analysis often characterizes Anglo-Saxon economies as providing
more ecient economic environments (La Porta et al. (1998), and others), the PMR index
varies over time, so we can examine its eect holding legal environments constant. In 1998,
the least competitive OECD country in the sample was Italy (-2.8), and the U.K had the
fewest barriers to competition in product markets (-1.1). In 2003, Mexico had the most
barriers to product market competition (-2.2), while Australia and the U.K. had the least
(-0.9).
The input market regulation index (RI) is an internationally comparable indicator that
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captures the importance of government regulations in industries whose main output is an
intermediate input for other industries. These key industries are (a) nancial services, (b)
energy, (c) transport and communications, and (d) retail distribution. For each of these
industries, the OECD quanties the level of competition by analyzing a similar set of barriers
to entry as those included in the PMR index (e.g. licensing and registration requirements,
ownership restrictions, pricing restrictions, protection to incumbents; Conway et al. (2006)).
The RI index was developed to empirically assess the impact of those regulations on other
industries. For example, nancial services regulations would tend to limit competition,
particularly in industries that rely on external sources of nancing (Rajan and Zingales,
1998). The RI index generalizes this idea to other industries by computing industry-specic
RI indexes using, for each nal-goods industry, the input weights from input-output matrices
from these intermediary industries. Time-series variation in the RI index results from changes
in government regulation aecting the competitive environment of input producing sectors.
As the PMR index, the RI index is computed in the 0-6 scale, where lower average values
correspond to the least restrictive environments.
Interestingly, recent empirical evidence provides direct evidence that input deregulation
aects the intensity of competition. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) show that lower restrictions
to U.S. banks lead to increasing competition in the product markets of other industries. Sim-
ilarly, Bertrand et al. (2007) document that banking deregulation in France led to increased
rates of entry and higher levels of restructuring of incumbent rms. Beyond nancing, Fran-
cois and Wooton (2008) show that regulation in non-traded services aects the performance
of exporters. Arnold et al. (2008) show that markets where input regulations are high are
correlated with slower rates of technology adoption and higher survival rates of inecient
rms.
Table 3.22 shows that the mean input competition, measured as the negative of the
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Regulatory Impact index, (-RI) is -0.136. The least competitive input markets are faced by
the water and air transportation industries in Italy in 1990, with RI scores of -0.847. On the
other extreme, 186 rm-year observations had RI scores of zero, which are indicative of no
barriers to input competition. Firms operating in such industries were located in countries
as diverse as Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom.
2.4 The Eect of Competition on the Level and Disper-
sion of PBC
2.4.1 Competition and the Level of Private Benets of Control
As a benchmark for the eect of competition on private benets of control, we start by
reporting dierences-in-means tests for rms in the most and least competitive environments.
To facilitate inference, we collapse voting premia and competition variables at the rm level
and report only one observation per rm.
Table 3.24 splits sample rms into two groups as a function of the intensity of competition.
We dene as highly (less) competitive (Columns II and III, respectively) rms those that
do business in markets that, relative to the sample, are less (more) heavily regulated. The
rst and second rows in Table 3 classify rms based on the intensity of product market and
input competition, respectively.
Using product market competition, Column II shows that the mean voting premium in
competitive environments is 0.235. In contrast, the average voting premium in less compet-
itive settings is 0.615. The dierence of 0.38 is statistically signicant at the ve-percent
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level.18 In economic terms, moving from a non-competitive to a highly competitive setting
implies a reduction of 61.8 percent in the estimated level of PBC.
Using input competition (Table 3.24, second row) yields similar results: the average
voting premium is 0.172 higher in more competitive industries, consistent with the idea that
input competition limits the level of PBC. In economic terms, the dierence of means across
groups is also substantial. Highly competitive rms exhibit a voting premium that is 37.4
percent lower relative to the less competitive group. Both for product and input competition
indexes, the Mann-Whitney test indicates that the distributions of private benets in the
low and high competition samples are signicantly dierent from each other.
While dierences of means are intuitive, the reported disparity in the level of private
benets may potentially reect the inuence of important omitted rm, industry or country
characteristics. As stated in Section 2.1, a widespread criticism of only relying on cross-
country variation is that countries dier in many dimensions, complicating inference. A
crucial advantage of the tests below is that we can overcome such criticism in at least three
ways. First, by introducing country-xed eects, we ensure that the results shown are
not driven by time-invariant country characteristics, such as the countryâs legal origin.
Second, controlling for rm-xed eects ensures that the results are not driven by rm
unobserved heterogeneity. Third, by focusing on an arguably exogenous source of variation
in product and input competition, we provide a tighter link between competition and the
voting premium.
In Table 3.25, Column I, we report the eect of product market competition on the
voting premium, without any controls. Given that the product competition index varies
at the country level, standard errors are clustered at the country level. The results in
18Standard errors are clustered at the relevant source of variation: country level (product market compe-
tition) and industry-country level (input competition).
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Column I show that increasing competition leads to lower levels of PBC. A one-standard
deviation reduction in policies that inhibit competition leads to a decline of 0.328 in the
voting premium.
In Table 3.25, Columns II to Column IV, we rst address whether time-invariant cross-
industry characteristics may be capturing the eect of competition on the voting premium.
Specically, we introduce two-digit industry-xed eects and an array of rm controls. Col-
umn II reports that the eect of product market competition on PBC is economically and
statistically large. The eect of product market competition on private benets is signicant
at the one-percent level.
To test whether certain rm characteristics may be capturing the reported eect of com-
petition on the voting premium, in Table 3.25, Column III, we also include rm level controls.
The eect of product market competition continues to be large and signicant. In Column
IV, we introduce country-xed eects. Including these controls allows us to control for po-
tential omitted variables. However, using these controls may come at a cost: the estimated
coecients in the regression that includes the controls are dicult to interpret if these con-
trol variables are themselves endogenous to competition. The specication that does not
include these controls is the reduced form eect of competition on PBC. In what follows, we
show both sets of results, with and without controls.
In Table 3.25, Columns V to VIII, we examine the eect of input competition on the
voting premium. The input competition index (- RI) captures the eect of anti-competitive
regulations on input markets. Column V shows the eect of input competition without
controls. The point estimate of -1.21 suggests that a one-standard deviation movement in this
index (0.101) is associated to a decline in the voting premium of 0.122. Column VI shows that
introducing country and year eects diminishes the magnitude and statistical signicance
of the input competition eect. The estimated coecient is -0.996, now signicant at the
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1 percent level. In Columns VII and VIII, we introduce industry controls and industry,
country and rm controls, respectively. The results indicate that, relative to the eect of
product market competition, the link between input competition and the voting premium is
robust in the aggregate.
Overall, Tables 3.24 and 3.25 provide evidence that competition can lead to signicantly
lower levels of PBC. We show that the results are not driven by time-invariant country charac-
teristics. This nding is important given the preexisting evidence that country characteristics
are extremely important for corporate governance outcomes (La Porta et al. (1998); Doidge
et al. (2007), and others). However, it does not help us determine whether competition leads
to lower PBC due to a reduction in the voting premia of incumbent rms or due to selection
eects, an issue that is addressed in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.2 Competition and Dispersion in Private Benets of Control
The summary statistics reported in Tables 3.22 and 3.23 document a signicant dispersion
in the voting premia for rms in the sample. Such dispersion is, by itself, not surprising.
Doidge et al. (2007), for example, document a substantial dispersion in governance outcomes
and emphasize the crucial role of country characteristics in explaining it.
In this section, we investigate whether competition limits the dispersion of private benets
of control. We proceed in two steps. First, we use quantile regressions to investigate the
importance of the within-country relative to the cross-country dispersion in PBC. Second,
we extend the quantile analysis to test whether competition plays a role in limiting the
within-country dispersion in the voting premia.
In Table 3.26, Panel A, we report the conditional 90th, 75th, 50th, 25th, and 10th quantiles,
when we only condition on year dummies. As expected, we document a large dispersion in
PBC in the sample. Table 3.26, Panel A, reports that the 90th and 75th percentiles of PBC
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are 0.90 and 0.21, respectively, signicant at the one-percent level. On the other extreme, the
25th and 10th percentiles are 0.01 and -0.09, respectively. The resulting dierences between
the 90th and the 25th and 10th percentiles are 0.888 and 0.992, respectively, conrming the
large dispersion in PBC reported both in the literature and in this chapter.
To investigate the importance of within-country dispersion in PBC, we include country
dummies in the quantile regressions analysis. The results are reported in Table 3.26, Panel
B. The estimates at all quantiles fall, indicating that a signicant fraction of the dispersion
is indeed driven by country dierences, as suggested by the earlier literature. Nonetheless,
there is still signicant within country variation that is not captured by country dummies.
For example, the dierence between the 90th and the 25th and 10th percentiles is 0.42 and
0.46 respectively, suggesting that 40 to 50 percent of the overall dispersion (from Panel A)
is explained by country dummies, but the remainder 60 percent is within country variation.
This is an important result: a substantial degree of dispersion in PBC is not explained by
time-invariant country characteristics.
We examine whether the dispersion in PBC can be linked to the intensity of competition
using quantile regressions. We are specically interested in evaluating whether the eect of
competition is similar for upper and lower quantiles of the PBC distribution. Table 3.27
examines the eect of the proxy for product market competition at dierent points of the
PBC distribution. In Panel A, we report quantile regressions that include year and coun-
try dummies and the product market competition index. The results show a signicantly
larger eect of competition in the upper quantiles of the PBC distribution. The 90th per-
centile conditional eect is -1.22, signicant at the one-percent level while the 10th percentile
estimated eect is -0.889.
In 3.27, Panel B, we examine the robustness of these results to the introduction of in-
dustry dummies. The conditional eects of product competition on the voting premia are
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-1.149, -0.923, -0.477, -0.262 and -0.494 at the 90th, 75th, 50th, 25th, and 10th quantiles, re-
spectively. These results conrm the idea that stier competition leads to an economically
large and statistically signicant reduction in the voting premia, and that the eect is larger
at the higher quantiles of PBC. For all panels, we report F-tests of whether each coecient
is signicantly dierent from the 90th percentile coecient to test whether the dispersion
signicantly falls with competition, which is supported empirically.
Finally, in Panel C, we use the natural logarithm of the voting premium as an alternative
dependent variable.19 This formulation allows us to test whether PBC changed propor-
tionately more at the top end of the PBC distribution. The results conrm that product
competition reduces the dispersion in private benets. In words, not only do PBC fall more
at the top quantiles, they also fall more than proportionally relative to the lower end of the
distribution.
In Table 3.27 we turn to test for the impact of input competition at dierent quantiles
of the PBC distribution. Panel A shows a large eect of -0.41 in the 90th quantile and
-0.14, -0.03, -0.02 and -0.06 at the remaining quantiles. Once we include industry controls
(Panel B) we nd that the conditional eect of input competition is concentrated in the top
quantiles. The estimated coecients at the 90th and 75th quantiles are -2.443 and -0.434,
respectively. The eect of input competition is indistinguishable from zero at the 90th and
lower quantiles. The estimated coecients reported in Table 3.27 replicate the pattern of
economically and statistically large eects of competition on the upper quantiles, and the
less signicant eects in the bottom quantiles of the PBC distribution. The F-tests conrm
that the high-to-low quantile estimated coecients are indeed statistically dierent from
19Since the voting premium is not bounded by zero as Nenova (2003) (pp. 334) and Doidge (2004) have
previously highlighted, and given that a logarithm transformation can only be applied to positive numbers,
whenever we use the logarithm of the voting premium we add a constant to the voting ratio such that the
lowest observation in the sample has a value of one (zero in the log scale).
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each other. These results are consistent with the idea that competition limits the dispersion
in the voting premium. The results in Panel C using the natural logarithm of the voting
premium as the dependent variable, conrm that PBC fall more than proportionately at the
top of the distribution.
A natural extension is, therefore, to examine the eect of output and input competition
on the entire distribution of the voting premia. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present such results. Each
point represents the estimated eect of competition on the voting premia at each percentile
of the PBC distribution, conditional on year, country and industry dummies. These gures
conrm the results from Table 3.28. Namely, that competition leads to a compression of
private benets.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 also provide an interesting insight into the relative eect of product
and input market competition on PBC. Figure 3.2 documents a nearly across-the-board
eect of product competition in limiting the level of PBC, especially for the 50th and higher
quantiles. Figure 3.3, in contrast, shows that for the bottom half of the PBC distribution,
the conditional eect of input competition is fairly at and close to zero. Input competition,
also has a large eect on PBC at the top quantiles, particularly in the top quartile of the
PBC distribution. Such results suggest that input markets may only bind as disciplinary
devices in settings where the level of managerial waste is suciently large.
More generally, the graphical representation of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 highlight the relevance
of quantile regressions. These gures show that competition does not equally aect the voting
premia at every point of its distribution. The larger competitive eects at the top quantiles
and the lower estimated coecients for the lower end of the PBC distribution imply that
competition leads to a reduction in the dispersion of private benets. Quantile regressions
allow us to unveil such insights, which would be potentially ignored had we examined only the
average eects of competition on the voting premia. Beyond the setting of this chapter, the
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results suggest that quantile regression techniques may be useful in a broad range of topics
in corporate nance, such as capital structure, investment, etc. In general, we know little
about dispersion in corporate nance. Our analysis suggests that focusing on distributions
rather than solely on means may be helpful to uncover new results or to provider sharper
tests for existing theories.
Overall, this section has documented a large dispersion in the voting premia that is
not explained by time-invariant country variables. We have provided consistent and robust
evidence that increases in product and input competition lead to signicant reductions in the
dispersion of voting premia. We have shown that while product and input markets aect the
average voting premium in dierent ways, they both limit the dispersion in private benets
of control.
2.4.3 Unleashing Competition: Does Competition Lead to Lower
PBC?
The evidence thus far presented has demonstrated that competition is a key determinant
in shaping the level and dispersion of private benets of control, both within countries
and industries. While such results are new in the literature, they do not provide direct
evidence that changes in competition do indeed discipline managers. As previously noted,
competition can induce existing rms to become more ecient, but competition may also
aect the selection of surviving rms. In consequence, the results may by be alternatively
explained by changes in the composition of rms or by the disciplinary role of competition
on incumbent rms. To test for the direct disciplinary eect of competition on the voting
premium, we introduce rm-xed eects, which allow us to assess whether stier competition
lead to changes in the level of PBC, holding rm-time invariant characteristics constant.
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Table 3.29 presents the results of product market competition on the voting premium.
Column I shows that, within rms, higher levels of product competition lead to lower esti-
mates of the private benets of control. Moving from Italy's product market competition
index to Franceâs in 2003âa 0.2 change in the indexâwould lead to a reduction of
0.268 in the voting premium, signicant at the one-percent level. In other words, the quality
of corporate governance within rms can be directly and drastically aected by deregulation
of product markets.
Table 3.29, Column II, introduces rm-level controls that capture rm, size, protability,
investment opportunities, relative dividend payments and volume. The estimated eect of
product market competition on the voting premium is largely unchanged both in economic
and statistical terms. The estimated coecient is -1.988, signicant at the one-percent level.
In Table 3.29, Columns III and IV, we investigate the eect of competition on the subsam-
ple of manufacturing rms. Manufacturing rms have lower price-to-cost markups in every
country for which OECD data exists (Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 2012), suggesting that
the degree of product dierentiation in manufacturing is substantially lower. Product dif-
ferentiation is important because it may limit the extent to which competing rms may
discipline incumbents. In Column III, the estimated coecient for the manufacturing sub-
sample is -1.34, signicant at the one-percent level. In Column IV, we include the same
rm-level controls as those in Column II, and the reported eect of competition on the
voting premium is larger. Finally, Column V shows the results for a subsample of rms
where actual dividend payouts are equal for both high- and low-voting securities, conrming
that the eect of competition is not driven by dierent dividend distributions for high- and
low-voting rights shares.
Table 3.30 explores the eect of input competition on PBC. Column I shows that once we
control for time-invariant rm characteristics, the eect of input competition on PBC, while
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negative, is only signicent at ten percent level. In Table 3.30, Column II, we reexamine
whether the eects of competition are relatively more relevant for manufacturing rms.
The estimated coecient reported in Column II shows a signicant eect of competition in
limiting PBC in manufacturing activities.
A concern with the estimated coecients reported in Columns I and II of Table 3.30 is
that the eect of input competition on PBC is dicult to establish in the panel specica-
tion because input competition does not vary substantially from year to year. The input
competition index is available at the annual frequency, while the product competition index
captures a ten-year variation between 1998 and 2008. To investigate this concern, in Ta-
ble 3.30, Columns III to VIII, we test for relatively large changes in the input competition
index within the manufacturing sector. We proceed in two steps. First, we create a scaled
version of the index that compares each annual input competition observation to the average
for each rm and test for its eect on PBC in Column III to VI. Second, we explore whether
large deviations from the rm average trigger signicant changes in the voting premium
(Columns VII and VIII).
Column III in Table 3.30 shows that higher levels of input competition lead to lower
estimates of private benets of control. In Columns VII and VIII we test for the symmetry
of this eect for suciently large changes in input competition. Specically, we include
indicator variables for cases in which the input competition index is larger or lower than its
mean by a given percent threshold. Column VII reports that when input market competition
increases by at least 2 percent, PBC decreases by 0..034. Small year-on-year decreases in
input competition, however, have no signicant eect on PBC. In contrast, large increases
in input competition do aect PBC signicantly (Column VIII).
Taken together, Tables 3.29 and 3.30 demonstrate that competition leads to lower es-
timates of private benets of control. The eect of product market competition is large
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and robust across specications and subsamples, indicating that the pressure from product
markets is crucial for private benets. The impact of input market competition, in contrast,
is predominantly important for relatively large changes in RI and for rms in manufactur-
ing settings. If we follow the pre-existing literature in interpreting the voting premia as a
measure of ineciency inside the rm, the results indicate that product and input market
competition do, indeed, discipline insiders.
We further test for this disciplinary channel by interacting the competition indexes with
a proxy for the degree of a rmâs eciency. Specically, we use the rst observation
per rm to test whether more protable rms are aected dierentially by competition. If
protability (net income to sales) captures relative eciency, we would expect protable
rms to be less sensitive to competition. In Table 3.31, Columns I to III, we show the
interaction between a dummy variable equal to one if the rm is in the top quartile in terms
of protability and the competition indexes.
We nd that the voting premium is more (less) responsive to product market competi-
tion in rms that are least (most) protable (Column I). The interactions with the input
competition index in Columns II and III are not statistically dierent from zero, but the
sign of the coecients follows that of the results from the product market analysis. The
results from Column I are consistent with the idea that competition disciplines insiders by
increasing their default probabilities.
An alternative test for the disciplining eect of competition is to investigate the inter-
action between competition and the quality of the domestic legal environment. Building
on the work of La Porta et al. (1998), several studies have documented that countries with
stronger rule-of-law environments tend to display lower private benets of control (Nenova,
2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Doidge, 2004). As such, the eect of competition would
be expected to be larger in settings where legal provisions are less eective. To test for
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this idea, we interact the two competition indexes with an indicator variable equal to one
whenever the country has a higher than median rule-of-law index, and zero otherwise. The
results are presented in Table 3.31, Columns IV and V. For both measures, we nd that the
eect of competition is predominantly larger in countries with relatively weaker rule-of- law
environments.
These ndings are consistent with the earlier reported result that competitive pressures
have a larger eect on the voting premia at higher levels of the private benets of control
distribution. Furthermore, the results are potentially informative for policy debates. While
the legal tradition that a given country inherited is dicult and costly to change, deregulation
of product and input markets is potentially easier and cheaper to implement. In sum,
competition is a powerful and potentially cost-eective tool to discipline insiders of publicly-
traded corporations.
2.5 Conclusion
A central tenet in nancial economics is that competition improves resource allocation and
performance. While this view dates back to Smith (1937), there has been little systematic
evidence for the link between changing competition and the quality of governance institutions
inside rms.
In this chapter, we examine the impact of competition on the level and the dispersion
of private benets of control enjoyed by the rm's controlling shareholders. We estimate
private benets of control using the voting premium between shares with dierential voting
rights. To capture the intensity of competition, we use two indexes of government regulations
directed at limiting product and input market competition. These indexes vary over time,
allowing us to examine the within-country relationship between competition and the voting
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premia. Furthermore, their time-series variation is arguably exogenous to individual rms'
decision-making, facilitating inference.
We nd that the intensity of product market competition signicantly and consistently
aects the estimates for the value of being in control. The results indicate that stier
competition may limit the scope of managerial waste and sharpen insiders' incentives to
perform. These competitive eects are particularly large for poorly run rms and for rms
operating in countries with weak legal environments.
The evidence also shows that competitive forces lead to a signicant reduction in the
dispersion in private benet consumption within industries and countries. We nd that
both product and input competition play a determining role in limiting the dispersion in
the voting premia. Surprisingly, the impact of competition on the dispersion of governance
outcomes has, thus far, been ignored in the governance literature.
Overall, the results demonstrate that competition policy can have a crucial inuence on
corporate governance. Furthermore, we think that the direct link between the intensity of
competition and measures of the quality of corporate governance, nancial development and
economic growth is a fruitful research agenda.
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Chapter 3
Insider Trading Prots and Executive
CompensationAre They Really
Substitutes?
Tao Li and Fangzhou Shi
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3.1 Introduction
Executive compensation of U.S. rms has provoked massive concerns, arguments, political
outrages and restrictive regulations. At the same time, regulations concerning insider trading
by status quo executives also never leave the spot light of nance world. The seemingly two
parallel issues in real world indeed have a fundamental connection: they both are ways
executives to get pecuniary benet from their jobs. In this chapter, we provide empirical
evidence on the relation between insider trading return and executive compensation: less cash
compensation is correlated with more informative insider trading with a larger transaction
volume, generating a higher insider trading prot.
The theoretical argument that insider trading can be viewed as an alternative form of
compensation dates back at least to Manne (1966). Carlton and Fischel (1983) support
this view by claiming that remuneration contracts taking into account insider trading can
make managers less risk-averse, thus better align the interests of shareholders and managers.
Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) note that investors subsidize managers through insider trad-
ing protswith the release of valuable insider information, managers will demand a higher
explicit compensation. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence has been mixed.1.
In this chapter, we extend the discussion by directly examining the correlation between
insider trading return and compensation at the rm level. Both cash compensation and
insider trading prots are direct compensation executives get form the rm. Using panel
data on US rms from 1992 to 2011, we nd strong evidence that insider trading prots
and executive direct compensation are negatively correlated-a one percent decrease in cash
compensation leads to a 21.7% increase in 6-month buy-and-hold excess returns, controlling
for rm characteristics. Further investigation shows that the higher prot is driven by both
1See Kato and Hebner (1997); Roulstone (2003); Zhang et al. (2005); Denis and Xu (2013); Trapani
(1990); Brenner (2011)
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higher excess trading return and a higher trading volume. We nd that for the average
rm, a one percent (or $6,358) decrease in cash compensation leads to a $13,611 increase in
6-month buy-and-hold excess prots, and 16200 more shares traded.
Another contribution of this chapter is to study the eect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX) on the aforementioned relationship. The shorter reporting requirement requested
by SOX encroached the relative information advantage of insider trading by letting market
learn the transaction detail earlier. We nd that the increase in 6-month buy-and-hold excess
returns is 4.8 percentage points lower after 2002 when cash compensation decreases by 1%,
reecting the loss of information advantage due to increased regulatory oversight. However,
the drop in insider trading prots is small in dollar amounts and there is no signicant change
in trading volume. This implies that the substitution eect of insider trading on executive
compensation is persistent and not weakened by exogenous shock in insider trading return.
In fact, trading volume is not sensitive to compensation level post SOX. Increase in excess
return is the only channel to raise compensation through insider trading.
Our work is related to two strands of research on insider trading: the relationship between
insider trading and compensation, and the information content of insider trading. First, it
is related to Manne (1966) well-established argument that insider trading returns are an
ecient means of rewarding managers for their eorts. A growing literature has indirectly
examined if insider trading regulation aects executives' compensation. Kato and Hebner
(1997) nd that executives in rms with more insiders receive more compensation because
expected trading prots tend to decrease with a higher number of insiders. Executives
need to be compensated for the expected loss of insider trading prots. Roulstone (2003)
shows that managers receive higher levels of compensation in companies with self-imposed
insider trading restrictions, compared with those in rms without such policies. He also
nds that rms restricting insider trading use more incentive compensation. Zhang et al.
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(2005) provide evidence on the relationship between the intensity of insider trading activities
and compensation through pay-performance sensitivity analysis. They nd an increased
(a decreased) level of insider trading is associated with a decreased (an increased) pay-
performance sensitivity. This suggests that companies take into account insider trading
prots when negotiating compensation contracts. Denis and Xu (2013) study the relationship
between insider trading restrictions and executive compensation across 40 countries. They
nd that top executive compensation is signicantly higher and contains a larger fraction of
equity payments in countries with stronger insider trading restrictions. This supports their
claim that insider trading is an implicit form of compensation. Aboody et al. (2011) examine
the association between insider trading returns and rm performance. They discover a
signicant positive correlation between insider trading returns and contemporaneous changes
in rms' operating income, supporting the view that companies may gain short-run incentive
alignments from insiders proting on their trades. However, they also show evidence that
this benet does not extend beyond 12 months.
On the other hand, some research directly investigate the relationship but do not nd
signicant result, either based on incomplete and dated data. Trapani (1990) nds no relation
between insider trading prots and executives' cash compensation, contradicting the view
that insider trading and explicit compensation are substitute forms of compensation. Brenner
(2011) looks at changes in German CEOs' compensation after insider trading was banned in
1994, and nds no correlation between compensation and insider trading returns. We build
on results based on the updated data about insider trading and executive compensation.
Second, our study is related to studies on the information content of insider trading.
Most recent empirical analysis show that insider purchases earn positive abnormal returns
but insider selling that is motivated by private information is dominated by portfolio re-
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balancing for diversication purposes (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).2 For this reason, our
analysis focuses on the open market purchase of stocks by corporate insiders.
Several studies have further examined the impact of SOX on insider trading and informa-
tion content suggested by insider trading. Carter et al. (2003) look at information leakage of
insider trading and its implications for outside investors. Using data in the early 1990s, they
nd that information leakage is positively associated with reporting lagsthose who mimic in-
sider buys earn greater abnormal returns between transaction date and SEC date if reporting
lags are longer. And information leakage for CEOs and other ocers dier only marginally.
Heron and Lie (2007) study the impact of SOX on protability of option grants. They nd
that average abnormal return during the week before (after) unscheduled option grants is
roughly 6(5) times larger for the period before SOX was implemented, which reduced the
reporting lag for option grants from 45 days to 2 days. Brochet (2010) nds evidence that
lings of insider purchases are signicantly more informative after SOX within a three-day
window. In terms of types of insiders, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) analyze directors' trad-
ing returns, and nd that independent directors are informed about the rm, both in good
times and bad news. Wang et al. (2012) nd that CFOs' trades are more informative than
CEOs' trades. Taking together, these studies suggest insiders have discretion to arbitrage
on information, and this discretion still exists after SOX.
Results in this chapter suggest that insider trading prots are an important substitute for
executive compensation in that a small decrease (increase) in compensation leads to a large
increase (decrease) in trading returns or prots. The evidence supports the well-established
argument Manne (1966) that insider trading is an ecient form of compensation. We also
document an unintended consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actit dampens the buer eect
of insider trading on executive compensation in terms of excess returns. But its impact on
2Related articles include Friederich et al. (2002); Jeng et al. (2003); Fidrmuc et al. (2006).
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trading prots is minimal.
3.2 Methodology
Taking same measures used by other research in insider trading, we use holding-period excess
prots and returns as our dependent variable. We focus on the 180-day holding-period prot
measure, as according to Short-swing Rule any insider trading prot generating from a
round transaction within six months has to be returned to the company. We also look at
30-day, 60-day and 90-day holding-period prots for consistency checks.
Our rst test investigates how changes in lagged compensation would change executives'
trading behavior and prots. We use the following specication:
ExRetit = αi + λt + γln(Compi,t−1) +X
′
itβ + εit (3.1)
The average holding-period excess prot for rm i in year t is a function of: the logarithm
of average compensation in rm i in year t− 1; major rm-level attributes Xit include rm
sizethe logarithm of assets, the logarithm of R&D expenditures and Tobin's Q; company
xed eect αi; and year xed eect λt. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
If a decrease in lagged compensation leads insiders to trade more aggressively on insider
information, then γ < 0. We also use the logarithm of excess prot as dependent variable, and
interpret γ as the elasticity of excess prot with regard to changes in lagged compensation.
One goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is to decrease information advantages of
insiders and make the stock market more transparent. After 2002, insiders only had 2 days
to le with SEC regarding their trading position, while they had up to 45 days to disclose
this information prior to the law was put in place. However, this restriction may induce
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insiders to change the trading behavior by exploiting more valuable private information. We
add an interaction term to equation 3.1:
ExRetit = αi + λt + γln(Compi,t−1) + δln(Compi,t−1)× PostSOX +X ′itβ + εit (3.2)
where PostSOX equals to 1 after 2002 and 0 before. If δ < 0, then after 2002, insiders
would have an incentive to exploit their private information, and as a result, the sensitivity
of excess trading prot with regard to a change in compensation would be higher. This would
be benecial for company insiders in that the substitution eect between insider trading and
compensation is stronger, and shocks to compensation can be better compensated by the
ability to gain a higher trading return. However, if δ > 0, it may indicate that insiders
became more dicult to generate excess return after SOX and executives were not able to
oset the declines in their compensation by the more aggressive trading behavior.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data
We collect from ExecuComp annual compensation data on companies' top ve highly paid
executives for the period 1992 to 2011. Variables used in this chapter include total com-
pensation, cash compensation (salary and bonus), restricted stock grant, and name of the
executive. We take the average of executives' compensation at the rm level.
Insider trading data is obtained from Thomson Reuters's Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF)
which is designed to capture all U.S. insider activity as reported on Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144.
Our sample includes all open-market purchases and sales made by company ocials over
the period 1992 to 2011. It includes transaction date, SEC ling date, transaction price,
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the number of shares transacted, name and role of the insider (executive, director, or block
holder) and other company level information. We also exclude transactions in which the
share price is below $1 to avoid liquidity issues in our estimation.3 We merge this dataset
with ExecuComp by name of the executive at the company level. So for each rm, we
have insider trading data for at most ve executives. If an executive has multiple same-day
purchases (or sales), we aggregate them as one transaction.
Daily stock returns for companies listed on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq are from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We also obtain value-weighted market return
for each stock. Then we match CRSP with the Insider Trading/ExecuComp dataset using
CUSIP. 30-day, 60-day, 90-day and 180-day holding-period returns and their corresponding
value-weighted market returns are calculated for each trade. The dierence between the
trade-level holding-period return and market return is the excess return. Multiplying it with
the number of shares traded, we obtain the excess prots. Then we compute the average
30-day holding-period excess return for each company in each year. Average company-level
60-day, 90-day and 180-day holding-period excess returns are calculated in the same fashion.
Supplemental rm-level control variables are obtained from the Compustat database.
They include value of the rm's assets, market capitalization, the book-to-market ratio,
Tobin's Q, industry code. Our nal sample consists of 8842 company-year observations.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.32 shows the breakdown of the sample for compensation and rm characteristics
before and after 2002, in which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted. Comparing executive
compensation in Panel A and that in Panel B, we do see an increase in compensation levels
3Lakonishok and Lee (2001).
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after 2002, both for cash and total compensation. Both mean and median total compensation
levels almost doubled after 2002; however, cash compensation only increased by around 20%,
reecting the general trend that rms were beginning to award more incentive compensation
to executives, in the form of restricted stocks and option grants. After 2002, there was
greater dispersion in cash compensation, as well as a more skewed distributionthe 99th
percentile cash compensation was 8 times the median, versus 6 for the period 1992-2002.
Firms are getting larger, measured by the value of their assets and market capitalization
(or R&D expenditures). The value of rms' assets was also more right-skewed. It may
be due to better coverage of the data or the fact more bigger rms' insiders involved in
insider transaction. For the median rm, its asset value and market capitalization were
roughly the same, for both periods. The average market capitalization was larger than the
average asset value, reecting the inuence of very big rms which tended to have larger
market capitalization than asset since previous research has shown the size of the rm has a
signicant eect on insider trading, we control it in our analysis.
Table 3.33 provides buy-and-hold excess returns, prots and trading volume for various
holding periods. Panel A shows summary statistics for the period 1992-2002. Average
buy-and-hold excess returns increased from 3.8% to 12.7% when the holding period was
extended from 30 days to 180 days. However, there was no clear pattern for the median
excess returns. This indicates that there was a much larger dispersion in excess returns
when the holding period increased. The same pattern holds true for holding-period excess
prots. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for buy-and-holding excess returns and prots
for the period 2003-2011. We see that 90-day and 180-day excess returns were higher for
the period 2003-2011, and the dispersion was somewhat lower. On the other hand, trading
volume signicantly decreased after the SOX reform. This can be important to our study:
if the lower dispersion was indeed due to the inability to explore more valuable private
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information, an executive would not be able to make up the loss by insider trading when his
or her paycheck shrank. Holding period excess prots were similar across Panel A and B,
with the dispersion lower in Panel B.
It is noteworthy that insider trading prot does not account for a big portion of exec-
utive's compensation. During 1992-2002, the average 180-day excess prot was only 0.84%
of average cash compensation, and 0.32% of total compensation. While for 2003-2011, the
average 180-day excess prot was only 0.53% of average cash compensation, and 0.13% of
total compensation. However, this does not translate to the ignorance of insider trading
prot, as the latter one is the most direct compensation executives can get wholly at their
discretion. Therefore we expect a strong relationship between insider trading prot and cash
compensation.
3.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we report empirical results on the correlation between insider trading and
compensation for the period of 1992-2011, as well as the impact of SOX on this relation-
ship. We start with the univariate analysis in Section 3.4.1, and multivariate analysis in
Section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Univariate Analysis
As a rst step, we are interested in the time series correlation between insider trading and
executive compensation. We begin by taking annual averages of insider trading returns
across all rms in our matched sample. We also take annual averages of lagged cash com-
pensation and total compensation for all rms. Figure 3.4 shows the time series pattern
between average insider trading returns and lagged cash compensation (in millions). There
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is a strong negative correlation between these two variables after 2000. Cash compensation
reached the peak around mid-2000, while 180-day buy-and-hold excess returns were among
the lowest. The evidence supports our hypothesis that amid lower cash compensation, ex-
ecutives are more likely to explore more valuable private information to gain a higher stock
return. Note that cash compensation became at after 2008, partly due to regulators eort
to curb cash compensation, and award executives more incentive compensation to better
align management and shareholders' interests.
Figure 3.5 plots the time series relationship between average insider trading returns and
lagged total compensation (in millions). The negative correlation is even more pronounced
here. Average total compensation reached local maximums in 1993, 2000 and 2006, while
average excess returns reached local minimums in 1994, 2001 and 2007. The evidence again
supports our view that insider trading and executive compensation are substitutes. One
caveat in this plot is that lower total compensation may automatically lead to higher excess
returns next period due to mean reversion of stock prices. Since stock grants typically
were a large part of the compensation package, a lower stock price contributes to lower
compensation, while it may also lead to a higher return next period due to mean reversion
of prices.
The similar pattern between trading volume and lagged compensation can be seen in
Figure 3.6. Trading volume touched the trough when lagged compensation reached the peak
in 2006. The correlation pattern is more signicant for cash compensation.
3.4.2 Insider Trading Returns and Executive Compensation
The univariate analysis above only provides evidence that insider trading excess returns
are negatively correlated with executive compensation on average. However, we are inter-
ested in exploring cross-sectional variation in insider trading as well as compensation. Since
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macroeconomic trends or rm characteristics may aect both insider trading and executive
compensation, we need to control these variables to eliminate omitted variable bias. To
achieve this, we take advantage of our panel dataset, and estimate multivariate panel regres-
sions in which the dependent variable is insider trading excess returns, trading volume and
prots. The variable of interest is the logarithm of executive compensation. The baseline
specication also includes a rm xed eect and year xed eect. The rm xed eect con-
trols for rm level unobservable heterogeneity, while the year xed eect controls for time
trends.
Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 3.35 show evidence that cash compensation and
insider purchase excess returns are negatively related, suggesting that executives tended to
explore more valuable private information when their cash income dropped. The coecients
of interest in Column (5) and (7) are statistically signicant at the 5% level. And all
four coecients are economically large. A 1% decrease in cash compensation leads to 3.7
percentage points increase in the 30-day buy-and-hold excess return for the period 1992-
2011. Considering the average 30-day buy-and-hold excess return in this period is only 3.8
percent, this is quite substantial.
We also nd that the longer the holding period, the greater the increase in excess returns
given one percent increase in cash compensation. We are most interested in the relationship
between the 180-day buy-and-hold excess return and cash compensation, because executives
are not allowed to sell their stocks within 6 months after they purchase stocks. Column (7)
of Table 3.35 shows that 1% decreases in cash compensation leads to 21.7 percentage points
increase in the 180-day buy-and-hold excess return for the whole sample. This is greater
than the sample average 180-day buy-and-hold excess return of 12.7 percent.
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3.4.3 Insider Trading Dollar Prots and Executive Compensation
To test whether insider trading prots do vary signicantly as a substitute of cash compensa-
tion, we regress holding-period excess prots on the logarithm of annual total compensation
on the rm level, controlling for rm xed eects and time trends. Column (1), (3), (5) and
(7) of Table 3.36 show that a decrease in cash compensation leads to an increase in excess
trading prots. The increase in prots is larger with a longer holding period. Most results
are statistically signicant at 10% level. The magnitude is also economically signicant. Col-
umn (7) indicates that a 1% decrease in cash compensation leads to a $13,611 increase in the
180-day buy-and-hold excess trading prot, while the increase in the 30-day buy-and-hold
excess prot is only $2,806. Since the average cash compensation for the sample is $635,800,
this suggests that for an average rm, a $6,358 decrease in cash compensation would lead to
a $13,611 increase in the 180-day buy-and-hold excess trading prot. The fact that excess
trading prot increases much more than the decrease in cash compensation suggests that
executives may be more likely to take advantage of their private information when they see
a lower explicit pay package.
3.4.4 Eect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SOX Act can be considered as an exogenous shock to insider trading return, as the shorter
reporting lag contributes to the transmission of private information to public. Theoretically,
this weakens the role of insider trading as a valid substitute for explicit compensation. The
coecient for the interaction term δ in 3.2 will be of interest. Following discussions focus on
the 180-day buy-and-hold excess returns or prots
As shown in Column (8) of Table 3.35, the substitution eect of insider trading became
less signicant after SOX was put in place. Before 2002, 1% decrease in cash compensation
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leads to 21.1% increase in trading returns; while after 2002, the same decrease leads to %14.2
increase in trading returns. The coecient is statistically signicant at 5%. Column (8) of
Table 3.37 conrms the nding. The increase in trading returns is 4.8% lower after 2002
when total compensation decreases by 1%.
In terms of dollar amount in trading prots, the results are much less signicant. Column
(8) of Table 3.36 indicates that increase in trading prots is only $2.98 lower after 2002 when
cash compensation decreases by 1%. The eect of SOX is even smaller and not statistically
signicant when total compensation changes, as shown in Column (8) of Table 3.37.
These results show that the substitution eect between cash compensation and insider
trading return is robust to decreasing excess insider trading return. The insignicant eect
on total dollar amount may be due to the accordingly adjustment of transaction volume.
That is to say, as the relative information advantages weaken, executives can adjust the
transaction amount to nally reach the same eect of substitution.
3.4.5 Transaction Volume
We have documented that executives' insider trade generate more prot after cash com-
pensation decreased. To better understand how important the role of informative trading,
measured by the insider trading return, we have to take into account of another choice
variable by executives: transaction volume.
As indicated in Table 3.39, average insider trading volume increased by 16200 shares
after 1% drop in cash compensation. However, this channel has been shut down after SOX
Act put in place. Therefore, after the reform in 2002, almost all of the substitution eect
comes from the more informative insider trading.
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3.4.6 Total Compensation
Both cash compensation and insider trading prots are explicit compensation. We would
expect most of the substitution eect is within this category, and insider trading prot is less
sensitive to change in total compensation. However, as the variation of cash compensation
account for most variation of total compensation, the insider trading return should still be
sensitive to total compensation.
As indicated in Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 3.37, all coecients on the logarithm
of total compensation are statistically signicant at least at 5%. Column (1) indicates that
1% decrease in cash compensation leads to 2.5% increase in the 30-day buy-and-hold excess
return, while Column (7) shows that 1% decrease in cash compensation leads to 15.9%
increase in the 180-day buy-and-hold excess return for the whole sample. These results again
conrm our hypothesis that insider trading and executive compensation are substitutes.
Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 3.38 conrm above results, although only the
coecient in Column (7) is statistically signicant at 5%. We nd that a 1% decrease in
total compensation leads to a $6,800 increase in the 180-day buy-and-hold excess trading
prot. For the average rm, this indicates that a $19,997 decrease in total compensation
induces an increase of $6,800 over the 6-month period. Trading prot is less sensitive to
changes in total compensation than changes in cash compensation, but extra trading prots
still make up 1/3 of the losses in total compensation.
Cautious should be taken when we measure the relationship between total compensation
and insider trading return. The negative relationship may be articial due to mean reversion
of stock prices, as we point out in Section 4.1. Since stock and option grants made up a large
part of the compensation package, a change in stock price may induce opposite changes in
total compensation and future returns
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3.5 Robustness Tests
We perform additional tests to ensure that our inquiries are correctly specied.
In evaluating the correlation between insider trading and total compensation in Sec-
tion 3.4, we dene total compensation as cash plus stock grants and net value of options
exercised (variable TDC2 in Execucomp). Here we use an alternative measure, which replaces
net value of options exercised with total value of options granted using the Black-Scholes
formula (variable TDC1 in Execucomp). Results from tting equations (1) and (2) are shown
in Table A.1. Comparing the results with those in Table 3.37 and 3.38, similar patterns exist.
Overall, the negative relation between insider trading and total compensation is somewhat
more pronounced for the alternative compensation measure.
We also use the industry return as our benchmark return. Results will are consistent.
3.6 Discussion
Both cash compensation and insider trading prots are forms of direct compensation. The
latter one is better controlled by executives themselves, compared to other form of compen-
sation. Our ndings, although partially conclusive given our reliance on the assumption that
any unobservable characterizes are time invariant and captured in rm xed eect, provide
evidence that executives actively make adjustment of insider trading behavior to counteract
any exogenous shock to other component of compensation.
Existing regulation concerning insider trading emphasize the importance of limiting
chances to prot from private information. On the other hand, policies concerning com-
pensation are narrowed in the explicit compensation contract. Unless we can completely
shut down the prior channel, which is unreasonable and inecient by existing research, ex-
ecutives can always get around of the regulation and motivate them to exploit more private
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information. Based on our result, this eect is both sensitive and signicant.
The weakened eect is not only restricted to policy regulation. Shareholder proposals or
vote against management compensation has been showed to eectively impact on executives'
compensation level. It is intriguing to see whether the seemingly eect is compromised once
taken into account of the insider trading prot. On the other hand, previous research linking
compensation structure and other Corporate Governance measures may be revised as the
variance of direct compensation part may not be as volatile as originally calculated. This




Table 3.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FINANCIAL VARIABLES
Firms in the sample are categorized as always non-group aliated, ever change group status
during the rst six years, and always group aliated. For each variable, the mean level is
reported, and the standard deviation is shown in the parenthesis. Tangibility is the ratio of
tangible xed asset over total asset. Leverage is the total asset over equity. The total asset
growth rate and total revenue growth rate are gross growth rates, calculated as level at t over the
level at t− 1. Market share is calculated as the ratio of revenue over the total revenue generated
in the respective country, industry (4-digit NAICS 2007 codes) and year.
Always Non-group Ever Change Group Status Always Group All
Number of Observations 1770524 115523 173641 2059688
Number of Firms 927987 39267 81528 1048782
Total Assets (in millions) 1.375 11.308 13.568 2.960
(5.781) (18.808) (20.621) (9.999)
Fixed Assets (in millions) 0.526 4.545 5.359 1.159
(2.638) (8.652) (9.493) (4.500)
Tangibility 0.245 0.215 0.210 0.240
(0.284) (0.297) (0.2971) (0.286)
Revenue (in millions) 3.119 47.295 63.613 10.236
(465.6) (1147.4) (700.4) (544.6)
Revenue/Total Assetst−1 2.628 1.819 1.760 2.516
(2.823) (2.172) (2.190) (2.762)
Gross Prot/Total Assets 1.326 0.673 0.648 1.238
(1.875) (1.156) (1.214) (1.824)
Gross Prot Margin (%) 50.291 37.379 39.831 48.784
(33.626) (31.339) (32.741) (33.692)
EBITDA/Total Assetst−1 0.185 0.025 0.013 0.162
(0.609) (0.419) (0.411) (0.588)
EBIT/Total Assetst−1 0.125 −0.032 −0.040 0.102
(0.702) (0.495) (0.483) (0.678)
Leverage 6.298 8.424 9.691 6.703
(21.931) (28.848) (33.330) (23.555)
Total Assets Growth Rate 1.481 1.503 1.464 1.481
(1.407) (1.623) (1.636) (1.446)
Revenue Growth Rate 1.487 1.641 1.591 1.506
(1.565) (1.993) (1.95) (1.635)
Market Share (4 digit NAICS) (h) 0.522 2.072 1.962 0.718
(2.157) (4.655) (4.604) (2.666)
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Table 3.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PROFILE AND LABOR
CHARACTERISTICS
Firms in the sample are categorized as always non-group aliated, ever change group status
during the rst six years, and always group aliated. For each variable, the mean level is
reported, and the standard deviation is shown in the parenthesis. Legalform code indicates the
incorporation form is public limited company (1), private limited company (2), or other forms (3).
ln(Marginal Productivity of Labor) is the logarithm of marginal productivity of labor as Larrain
and Stumpner (2013) for manufacturing rms. Top Manager Tenure for each manager indicates
the total years serving as a top manager across positions. The rm average is reported in the
table. Top Manager Tenure (same industry) further requires the experience is in the same
industry (2-digit NAICS 2007 codes).
Always Non-group Ever Change Group Status Always Group All
Age 2.914 3.058 3.088 2.937
(1.448) (1.383) (1.430) (1.444)
Age (rst enter sample) 2.358 2.004 2.474 2.354
(1.466) (1.209) (1.473) (1.460)
Lagalform Code 1.947 1.812 2.004 1.944
(0.508) (0.658) (0.677) (0.535)
Number of Employees 13.301 62.187 70.936 21.4
(38.629) (104.502) (111.873) (58.484)
Wage per Employee 26.626 55.365 55.922 31.032
(in thousands, per year) (31.673) (39.619) (39.837) (34.630)
Revenue per Employee 181.104 434.956 464.220 221.302
(in thousands, per year) (406.454) (741.028) (783.361) (486.928)
Prot per Employee 6.576 7.903 8.116 6.794
(in thousands, per year) (37.605) (71.248) (73.038) (44.571)
Wage Expense/Revenue (%) 24.708 31.757 32.060 25.714
(24.010) (30.273) (30.135) (25.161)
ln(Marginal Productivity of Labor) 4.443 5.754 5.871 4.665
(manufacturing sector only) (1.578) (1.125) (1.066) (1.593)
Number of Top Managers 1.237 1.271 1.2641 1.243
(0.527) (0.592) (0.593) (0.540)
Proportion of New Manager 0.046 0.106 0.119 0.058
(0.193) (0.285) (0.302) (0.217)
Top Manager Tenure 7.360 13.541 18.906 9.084
(16.469) (22.029) (29.452) (19.148)
Top Manager Tenure (Same Industry) 6.887 12.630 17.725 8.499
(15.061) (20.642) (27.690) (17.698)
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Table 3.3: CHANGE OF PROFITABILITY AROUND THE GROUP STATUS
CHANGE: DIFFERCEN-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS BASED ON
NONPARAMETRIC MATCHING
This table shows the change of EBITDA/Total Assetst−1 two years around rms unintentionally
join (Panel A) and leave (Panel B) business groups. In Panel A, rms in the treatment sample
unintentionally join business groups. The control sample includes always non-group rms exactly
matched with the age, legal incorporation form, country, industry, and year. In Panel B, rms in
the treatment sample unintentionally leaves business groups. The control sample includes always
group rms exactly matched with the age, legal incorporation form, country, industry, and year.
Column I reports the average level of EBITDA/Total Assetst− 1 two years before the group
status change. Column II reports the average level two years after the change. The third column
reports the protability change, calculated by the dierence between the rst two columns. The
Di-in-Di statistics are dierences of the protability change across the treatment sample and
control sample. Standard deviation is reported in the parenthesis. The number in the bracket
indicates the ratio of the estimator over the sample average of EBITDA/Total Assett−1. ***, **
and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
EBITDA / Total Assetst−1
Two Years Before Two Years After Dierence Across Time
(I) (II) (II) - (I)
Panel A. Unintentionally Joining Business Groups
Treatment Sample (T) 0.017 0.045 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Control Sample (C) 0.023 0.033 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Di-in-Di Mann Witney |z|
Dierence Across Samples ( T - C ) -0.006 0.018*** 2.362***
(0.004) (0.005)
[11.11%]
Panel B. Unintentionally Leaving Business Groups
Treatment Sample (T) 0.018 0.032 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Control Sample (C) 0.028 0.041 0.013***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Di-in-Di Mann Witney |z|




Table 3.4: GROUP AFFILIATION / DETACHMENT EFFECT ON THE
PROFITABILITY  UNINTENTIONAL CHANGE OF GROUP STATUS
Panel A and B report results for the group aliation and group detachment respectively. Column
I and II are based on rms ever unintentionally join (leave) business groups. Column III and
Column IV add rms always non-group (group) aliated. Column V and Column VI further add
rms always (never) group aliated. GroupDummy is equal to 1 when the rm is in a business
group and 0 otherwise. LagParentInd is equal to 1 if the rm had at least one parent corporate
shareholder one year before, and 0 otherwise. Through all of the columns, rm xed eects and
country-year dummies are controlled. Column II, IV, and VI further control the rm level
variables, including one year lagged ln(total assets), leverage ratio, tangibility, age, and legal
incorporation form. The standard deviation is clustered at country-industry (2-digit NAICS), and
is presented in the parenthesis. The number in the bracket indicates the ratio of the estimator
over the sample average of the dependent variable. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable EBITDA / Total Assetst−1
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Panel A. Unintentionally Joining Business Groups
GroupDummy 0.015*** 0.012** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
[9.26%] [7.41%] [12.35%] [13.58%] [11.11%] [11.73]
LagParentInd 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Sample
Ever join group Ever join group Ever join group Ever join group Ever join group Ever join group
Always non-group Always non-group Always group Always group
Always non-group Always non-group
Observations 37447 36160 945169 945129 1042655 1042589
Number of rms 12866 12827 502952 502933 552164 552133
R-squared (Within) 0.011 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015
R-squared (All) 0.646 0.653 0.827 0.828 0.827 0.827
Panel B. Unintentionally Leaving Business Groups
GroupDummy -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)




Ever leave group Ever leave group Ever leave group Ever leave group Ever leave group Ever leave group
Always group Always group Always group Always group
Always non-group Always non-group
Observations 18136 17780 191777 111509 1029338 1029300
Number of rms 7019 7004 88547 55981 546669 546656
R-squared (Within) 0.015 0.017 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.010
R-squared (All) 0.717 0.723 0.750 0.784 0.828 0.829
Country×year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.5: GROUP AFFILIATION / DETACHMENT EFFECT ON THE
PROFITABILITY  GENERAL CHANGE OF GROUP STATUS
Panel A and B report results for the group aliation and group detachment respectively. Column
I and II are based on rms ever join (leave) business groups. Column III and Column IV add rms
always non-group (group) aliated. Column V and Column VI further add rms always (never)
group aliated. GroupDummy is equal to 1 when the rm is in a business group and 0 otherwise.
LagParentInd is equal to 1 if the rm had at least one parent corporate shareholder one year
before, and 0 otherwise. Through all of the columns, rm xed eects and country-year dummies
are controlled. Column II, IV, and VI further control the rm level variables, including one year
lagged ln(total asset), leverage ratio, tangibility, age, and legal incorporation form. The standard
deviation is clustered at country-industry (2-digit NAICS), and is presented in the parenthesis.
The number in the bracket indicates the ratio of the estimator over the sample average of the
dependent variable. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Dependent Variable EBITDA / Total Assett−1
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Panel A. Joining Business Groups
GroupDummy 0.008*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
LagParentInd 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Sample
Ever join group Ever join group Ever join group Ever join group Ever join group Ever join group
Always non-group Always non-group Always group Always group
Always non-group Always non-group
Observations 97118 94192 991083 991036 1088569 1088496
Number of rms 38086 37964 527217 527193 576429 576393
R-squared (Within) 0.010 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.013
R-squared (All) 0.686 0.693 0.827 0.828 0.826 0.827
Panel B. Leaving Business Groups
GroupDummy -0.010** -0.009* -0.007* -0.008** -0.010* -0.011**




Ever leave group Ever leave group Ever leave group Ever leave group Ever leave group Ever leave group
Always group Always group Always group Always group
Always non-group Always non-group
Observations 73526 72775 247167 240184 1079468 1079428
Number of rms 36366 36329 117894 115680 575605 575590
R-squared (Within) 0.008 0.011 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.009
R-squared (All) 0.754 0.758 0.754 0.758 0.827 0.828
Country×year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.11: AFFILIATION WITH POWERFUL GROUPS FURTHER
INCREASES REVENUE AND MARKET SHARE
Panel A shows the summary statistics of the group's market share one year before the new rm
unintentionally joins the group. It is calculated as the ratio of total revenue generated by all group
members within the same industry as the new rm, over the total revenue generated in the
respective country, industry (4-digit NAICS 2007 codes) and year. In Panel B, a cross term
between GroupDummy and an indicator dummy is introduced in the regressions. GroupDummy
is equal to 1 when the rm is in a business group and 0 otherwise. Igroup share > 75th pctl. is equal to
1 if the group share is higher than the 75th percentile, and 0 otherwise. Through all of the
columns, rm xed eects, country-year dummies, and rm level variables are included. Firm
controls include one year lagged ln(total assets), leverage ratio, tangibility, age, and legal
incorporation form. TOAS stands for Total Assets. The standard deviation is clustered at
country-industry (2-digit NAICS), and is presented in the parenthesis. The number in the bracket
indicates the ratio of the estimator over the sample average of the dependent variable. ***, ** and
* denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A. Summary Statistics
Percentile
No. 25th 50th 75th Mean S.D.
Group's Market Share (h) 12843 0.069 0.353 1.970 6.462 28.224
Panel B. Regression Results
Dependent Variables Revenue/TOASt−1 Gross Prot/TOASt−1 Market Share (h)
(I) (II) (III)
GroupDummy 0.091*** 0.059* 0.100***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035)
[3.62%] [4.77%] [13.93%]
GroupDummy × Igroup share > 75th pctl. 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.095**
(0.038) (0.033) (0.047)
[3.06%] [6.38%] [13.23%]
Country×year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Sample Ever Join group + Always non-group
Observations 852273 825003 852372
Number of rms 457991 449425 457990
R-squared (Within) 0.049 0.033 0.040
R-squared (All) 0.877 0.897 0.933
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Table 3.12: CUMULATIVE MANAGER TURNOVER RATIO AFTER
GROUP AFFILIATION
This table presents the average cumulative turnover ratios of top managers. Panel A shows the
statistics for rms unintentionally join business groups. The rst row reports the accumulative
ratio of rms with at least one turnover, up to three years after joining business groups. The
second row reports the accumulative ratio of new managers. The third row reports the percentage
of new managers worked as top managers at other rms within the same group, among all new
managers. Panel B repeat the statistics for rms join business groups, either unintentionally or
not.
Years After Joining Business Groups
First Year Within Two Years Within Three Years
Panel A. Unintentionally Join Business Groups
Ratio of Firms With at least One Turnover4 13.25% 17.77% 19.56%
Ratio of New Managers5 9.30% 13.10% 14.69%
Ratio of New Managers from the Forthcoming Group 28.21% 28.56% 28.67%
Panel B. Generally Join Business Groups
Ratio of Firms With at least One Turnover 15.78% 20.36% 22.14%
Ratio of New Managers 10.76% 14.72% 16.40%
Ratio of New Managers from the Forthcoming Group 35.37% 34.13% 33.84%
4On average, 7.52% of rms have at least one top manager turnover each year.
5On average, 5.8% of top managers are new managers.
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Table 3.13: CHANGES OF TOP MANAGERS' CHARACTERISTICSS UPON
UNINTENTIONAL GROUP AFFILIATION: DIFF-IN-DIFF ANALYSIS
This table shows the change of proportion of new managers (Panel A), management tenure (Panel
B), and management tenure within the same industry (Panel C) two years around rms
unintentionally joins business groups. The treatment sample includes rms unintentionally join
business groups. The control sample includes always non-group rms exactly matched with the
age, legal incorporation form, country, industry, and year. Column I reports the average level of
two years before the group status change. Column II reports the average level two years after the
change. The third column reports the change of relative variable, calculated by the dierence
between the rst two columns. The Di-in-Di statistics are dierences of the above changes
across the treatment sample and control sample. Top Manager Tenure for each manager indicates
the total years serving as a top manager across positions. The rm average level is reported in the
table. Top Manager Tenure (same industry) further requires the experience is in the same industry
(2-digit NAICS). ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Two Years Before Two Years After Dierence Across Time
(I) (II) (II) - (I)
Panel A. Proportion of New Managers
Treatment (T) 0.061 0.101 0.040***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Control (C) 0.058 0.076 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Di-in-Di Mann Witney |z|
Dierence Across Samples ( T - C ) 0.003 0.022*** 3.594***
(0.002) (0.003)
Panel B. Top Manager Tenure (position× year)
Treatment (T) 13.384 18.909 5.525***
(0.209) (0.250) (0.078)
Control (C) 12.831 15.301 2.470***
(0.099) (0.120) (0.031)
Di-in-Di Mann Witney |z|
Dierence Across Samples ( T - C ) 0.553 3.055*** 18.389***
(0.275) (0.080)
Panel C. Top Manager Tenure within the Same Industry (position× year)
Treatment (T) 12.279 17.530 5.521***
(0.191) (0.250) (0.082)
Control (C) 11.938 14.210 2.272***
(0.090) (0.120) (0.033)
Di-in-Di Mann Witney |z|











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.17: GROUP AFFILIATION EFFECT ON THE PROFITABILITY -
USING GROUP'S TOTAL HOLDING
This table shows the results when group's total holding is used to capture group aliation. Panel
A shows the summary statistics for Group Total Holding, which is total ownership stakes on the
new rm from all group members. Panel B shows the regression results. Column I is based on
rms ever unintentionally join business groups. Column II adds rms always non-group aliated.
Column III further adds rms always group aliated. GroupTotal is equal to the group total
holding when the rm is in a business group and 0 otherwise. LagParentInd is equal to 1 if the
rm had at least one parent corporate shareholder one year before, and 0 otherwise. Through all of
the columns, rm xed eects and country-year-industry (2-digit NAICS) dummies are controlled.
Column II, IV, and VI further control the rm level variables, including one year lagged ln(total
assets), leverage ratio, tangibility, age, and legal incorporation form. The standard deviation is
clustered at country-industry (2-digit NAICS), and is presented in the parenthesis. The number in
the bracket indicates the ratio of the estimator over the sample average of the dependent variable.
***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A. Summary Statistics
No. of Obs. Min. Median Max. Mean S.D.
Group Total Holding 12827 0.328 0.980 1 0.865 0.226
Panel B. Regression Results
Dependent Variable: EBITDA / Total Assetst−1
(I) (II) (III)




Country×year Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Sample
Ever Joining group Ever Joining group Ever Joining group
Always non-group Always non-group
Always group
Observations 36162 945140 1042608
Number of rms 12827 502936 552138
R-squared (Within) 0.025 0.020 0.015
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.22: SUMMARY STATISTICS
This table presents summary statistics for rms with dual-class shares with dierential voting
rights and matching competition information from the OECD for at least one year between 1990
and 2008. The voting premium is dened as (PH − PL)/(PL − rv ∗ PH) where PH and PL are,
respectively, the price of the higher and lower voting power securities and rv is the ratio of votes
per share for the high- and low-voting securities. Votes per shares, high and low, are the per-share
votes of the higher and lower rights shares, respectively. Votes low-to-high ratio is the rm ratio of
votes of the low-to- high voting securities. Votes low-to-high per dividends is the ratio of votes of
the low voting security per dollar of dividend divided by the votes of the high voting security per
dollar of dividends. Product market regulation (PMR) is an OECD index (scale: 0 to 6) of the
degree to which government policies restrict competition in product markets at the country level,
available for 1998 and 2003. Regulatory impact (RI) is an OECD index that measures the degree
of government regulation (scale: 0 to 6) aecting input markets. RI varies by industry and
country and is available until 2003. Product and input market competition indexes are the
negative of PMR and RI, respectively: Higher values indicate higher levels of competition.
Lnassets is the natural logarithm of assets in U.S. dollars. Market-to-book ratio is the market
value of equity plus the total value of assets minus the book value of equity divided by the value of
assets. Net income/sales is the ratio of net income relative to the value of sales. Relative
dividends is the ratio of the annual per-share dividend payments for the low-voting share to the
annual per- share dividend payments to the high-voting security. GDP growth is the rate of
growth in the gross domestic product. Market capitalization to GDP is the ratio of the total
market value of listed companies to GDP. FDI inow to GDP is the ratio of foreign direct
investments (net inows) relative to the value of GDP. Unemployment rate is the fraction of the
labor force that is unemployed.
Variable Number Average Median Standard
Firm-Year Deviation
Voting premium (ratio) 7599 0.319 0.053 0.978
Votes per share, high voting share 7599 5.116 1 32.816
Votes per share, low voting share 7599 0.222 0 2.017
Votes low-to-high ratio 7599 0.035 0 0.084
Votes low-to-high per dividends 4979 5.229 0.997 40.481
Product market competition index 1373 -1.61 -1.48 0.5
(-) Product market regulation (PMR) index
Input competition index 7219 -0.136 -0.086 0.101
(-) regulatory impact (RI) index
Ln assets (in millions, US dollars) 6783 7.241 7.104 3.361
Market to book (ratio) 6735 1.294 1.072 0.726
Net income / sales (ratio) 6757 0.023 0.034 0.288
Relative dividends (ratio) 4979 5.229 0.997 40.481
GDP growth (in percent) 7599 2.759 2.803 2.497
Market capitalization to GDP (ratio) 7599 75.583 62.038 46.028
FDI inow to GDP (ratio) 7599 2.167 1.324 3.067


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.24: INTENSITY OF PRODUCT AND INPUT MARKET
COMPETITION AND THE VOTING PREMIA: DIFFERENCES OF MEANS
This table shows the mean voting premia for rms with matching competition information. The
voting premium is dened as (PH − PL)/(PL − rv ∗ PH) where PH and PL are, respectively, the
price of the higher and lower voting power securities and rv is the ratio of votes per share for the
high- and low-voting securities. The rst row reports data for rms with matching product market
regulation (PMR) information from the OECD. The second row reports data for rms with
matching regulatory impact (RI) information from the OECD. PMR and RI capture the level of
anti-competitive regulations aecting, respectively, product and input markets. PMR captures
regulations at the country level, while RI denotes country-industry-level restrictions. Column I
shows mean voting premia for all rms. Columns II and III divide rms into two groups: highly
and less competitive, respectively. A rm is classied as being in a highly competitive
environment if the rm is subject to below median levels of anti-competitive regulation. The rm
is classied as less competitive if regulatory restrictions are above the sample median. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country (PMR) and
country-industry (RI) level. The number of rms used to compute the average is reported in
squared brackets. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Measures of All Highly Less Dierence Mann
Competition Firms Competitive Competitive (II)-(III) Whitney |z|
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Product market competition 0.432** 0.235** 0.615** -0.380** 5.920***
(0.172) (0.0915) (0.219) (0.178) 39.03%
[708] [342] [366]
Input competition 0.375*** 0.288*** 0.460*** -0.172* 1.768*












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.27: PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND THE DISPERSION
OF THE VOTING PREMIA
The dependent variables are the voting premium between shares of dierential voting rights
(Panels A and B) and the natural logarithm of the voting premium (Panel C). The voting
premium is dened as (PH − PL)/(PL − rv ∗ PH) where PH and PL are, respectively, the price of
the higher and lower voting power securities and rv is the ratio of votes per share for the high-
and low-voting securities. All coecients are obtained using quantile regressions estimated at
dierent quantiles (90th, 75th, 50th, 25th and 10th percentiles, respectively) of the voting premium
distribution. The panels below show the conditional eect of product market competition on the
voting premium at each quantile of the voting premium distribution. The product market
competition index is dened as the negative of the product market regulation (PMR) index:
higher values indicate higher levels of competition. PMR is an OECD index that captures the
degree to which government policies restrict competition in product markets at the country level.
Panel A includes country and year dummies, and Panels B and C include country, year and
industry (two-digit ISIC) dummies. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and
* denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: voting premium
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Percentile
90th 75th 50th 25th 10th
Panel A:
Product market competition index -1.217*** -0.870*** -0.464*** -0.234*** -0.889***
(- PMR) (0.439) (0.157) (0.107) (0.080) (0.318)
F-Test: Coecient dierent from 90th percentile
Country and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1373 1373 1373 1373 1373
Panel B:
Product market competition index -1.149*** -0.923*** -0.477*** -0.262*** -0.494**
(- PMR) (0.296) (0.148) (0.106) (0.102) (0.201)
F-Test: Coecient dierent from 90th percentile 0.89 5.65** 9.05*** 3.81*
Country and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1373 1373 1373 1373 1373
Panel C: Dependent variable: ln(voting premium)
Product market competition index -0.511*** -0.513*** -0.373*** -0.251** -0.843
(- PMR) (0.151) (0.078) (0.072) (0.098) (0.753)
F-Test: Coecient dierent from 90th percentile 0 0.82 2.45 0.19
Country and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1373 1373 1373 1373 1373
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Table 3.28: INPUT MARKET COMPETITION AND THE DISPERSION OF
THE VOTING PREMIA
The dependent variable is the voting premium between shares of dierential voting rights (Panels
A and B) and the natural logarithm of the voting premium (Panel C). The voting premium is
dened as (PH − PL)/(PL − rv ∗ PH) where PH and PL are, respectively, the price of the higher
and lower voting power securities and rv is the ratio of votes per share for the high- and
low-voting securities. All coecients are obtained using quantile regressions estimated at dierent
quantiles (90th, 75th, 50th, 25th and 10th of the voting premium distribution. The panels below
show the conditional eect of input competition on the voting premium at each quantile. Input
market competition is dened as the negative of the Regulatory Impact (RI) index: higher values
indicate higher levels of competition. Regulatory Impact (RI) is an OECD index that measures
the degree of government regulation aecting input markets. RI varies by industry and country.
Panel A includes country and year dummies, and Panels B and C include country and industry
(two-digit ISIC) indicator variables. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and
* denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: voting premium
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Percentile
90th 75th 50th 25th 10th
Panel A:
Input competition index -0.408** -0.142** -0.034** -0.018 -0.052*
(- RI) (0.160) (0.057) (0.018) (0.012) (0.031)
F-Test: Coecient dierent from 90th percentile
Country and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7219 7219 7219 7219 7219
Panel B:
Input competition index -2.443*** -0.434*** -0.110 -0.102 -0.0819
(- RI) 20.25*** 20.14*** 22.32*** 21.9***
F-Test: Coecient dierent from 90th percentile
Country and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7219 7219 7219 7219 7219
Panel C: Dependent variable: ln(voting premium)
Input competition index -1.574*** -0.462*** -0.121 -0.151*** -0.171
(- RI) (0.471) (0.159) (0.083) (0.058) (0.124)
F-Test: Coecient dierent from 90th percentile 7.53*** 10.36*** 9.48*** 9.09***
Country and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7219 7219 7219 7219 7219
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Table 3.29: PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND THE VOTING
PREMIUM: WITHIN-FIRM ANALYSIS
The dependent variable is the voting premium between shares of dierential voting rights. The
voting premium is dened as (PH − PL)/(PL − rv ∗ PH) where PH and PL are, respectively, the
price of the higher and lower voting power securities and rv is the ratio of votes per share for the
high- and low-voting securities. The product market competition index is dened as the negative
of the product market regulation (PMR) regulation index: higher values indicate higher levels of
competition. PMR is an OECD index that captures the degree to which government policies
restrict competition in product markets at the country level. All specications include rm- and
year-xed eects. Columns (I) and (II) report within-rm estimates for all rms in the sample.
Columns (III) and (IV) show within-rm estimates only for manufacturing rms. Column (V)
reports estimated coecients for rms for which both dual-class shares were reported as having
equal dividends. Columns (II) and (IV) to (V) include the following rm-level yearly controls: ln
rm assets, market-to-book ratio, net income to sales, the relative liquidity (relative ratio of shares
traded) and dividends of the high- and low-voting shares. Standard errors are clustered at the
country level. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: voting premium
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Product market competition index -1.339** -1.988*** -1.338* -2.324*** -1.910***
(- PMR) (0.494) (0.509) (0.687) (0.676) (0.475)
Sample All All Manuf. Manuf. All
Same divs.
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed-eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1373 1373 1373 1373 1373











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.31: PRODUCT AND INPUT MARKET COMPETITION AND THE
VOTING PREMIA: INTERACTIONS
The dependent variable is the voting premium between shares of dierential voting rights. The
voting premium is dened as (PH − PL)/(PL − rv ∗ PH) where PH and PL are, respectively, the
price of the higher and lower voting power securities and rv is the ratio of votes per share for the
high- and low-voting securities. Product and input market competition indexes are the negative of
the product market regulation (PMR)and regulatory impact (RI) anti-competitive regulation
indexes, respectively: Higher values indicate higher levels of competition. PMR is an OECD index
that captures the degree to which government policies restrict competition in product markets at
the country level. RI is an OECD index that measures the degree of government regulation
aecting input markets. RI varies by industry and country. All specications include rm- and
year-xed eects. High protability is an indicator variable equal to one if the rm's net income to
sales in the rst year the rm appears in the sample is above the 25th percentile of such
protability variable for the entire sample. High rule of law is a dummy equal to one if the rm is
in a country with above-median rule of law La Porta et al. (2000). Standard errors are clustered
at the country level (Columns (I) and (IV)) and country and industry level (Columns (II), (III)
and (V). ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: voting premium
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Product market competition index -1.348*** -0.861***
(- PMR) (0.182) (0.152)
Input competition index -4.095 -11.71*** -7.801***
(- RI) (2.589) (2.457) (1.716)
High protability * product market competition index 0.685*** 3.277 7.124***
(0.137) (2.070) (2.065)
High protability * input competition index
High rule of law * product market competition index 1.241***
(0.161)
High rule of law * input competition index 9.064***
(1.802)
Sample: All All Manuf. All All
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed-eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1373 7219 3618 1373 7219




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.39: INSIDER TRADING VOLUME
Dependent variable: Trading Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4)








ln(MV) (thousand) -0.293** -0.283***
(0.130) (0.134)
Tobin's Q 0.287 0.372*
(0.214) (0.210)
Constant 111.3** 89.1* 56.1** 30.3
(41.5) (48.1) (23.0) (27.9)
Firm Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8517 8456 8517 8456
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
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Figures














Figure 3.1: CHANGE OF THE PROFITABILITY UPON UNINTENTION-
ALLY JOINING BUSINESS GROUPS
This gure shows the change of EBITDA/Total Assetst−1 two years around rms unintentionally join business
groups. For each rm unintentionally joins business group at event year = 0, a control sample of always
non-group rms is constructed, based on exact matching with the age, legal incorporation form, country,
industry, and year. The solid line indicates rms unintentionally join business groups, while the dashed line
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Figure 3.2: EFFECT OF PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION ON THE
VOTING PREMIUM
This gure shows the conditional eect of product market competition as measured by the negative of the
product market regulation index (PMR) on the voting premium, the estimate of private benets of control
(PBC) used in this paper, at each point of the PBC distribution. The X-axis shows the quantile of the PBC
distribution. The Y-axis shows the magnitude of the conditional eect of product market competition. The
solid line plots the estimated conditional eect of product market competition on the voting premium at
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Figure 3.3: EFFECT OF INPUT COMPETITION (- RI) ON THE VOTING
PREMIUM
This gure shows the conditional eect of input competition as measured by the negative of the regulatory
impact index (RI) on the voting premium, the estimate of private benets of control (PBC) used in this
paper, at each point of the PBC distribution. The X-axis shows the quantile of the PBC distribution. The
Y-axis shows the magnitude of the conditional eect of input competition. The solid line plots the estimated
conditional eect of input competition on the voting premium at each percentile of the voting premium























































1992 1997 2002 2007
Volume
Lagged Cash Comp































Aboody, D., Hughes, J., Ke, R., Ross, N., 2011. Executive talent, insider trading, and rm
performancen. Working Paper .
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., Matos, P., 2011. Does governance travel around the
world? evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 100, 154
181.
Alchian, A. A., 1950. Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory. The Journal of Political
Economy pp. 211221.
Almeida, H., Campello, M., Weisbach, M. S., 2004. The cash ow sensitivity of cash. The
Journal of Finance 59, 17771804.
Almeida, H., Park, S. Y., Subrahmanyam, M. G., Wolfenzon, D., 2011. The structure and
formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 99, 447475.
Almeida, H. V., Wolfenzon, D., 2006. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business
groups. Journal of Finance 61, 26372680.
Arellano, C., Bai, Y., Zhang, J., 2012. Firm dynamics and nancial development. Journal of
Monetary Economics 59, 533549.
127
Arnold, J., Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta, S., 2008. Regulation, allocative eciency and produc-
tivity in oecd countries. OECD Publishing .
Baiman, S., Verrecchia, R. E., 1996. The relation among capital markets, nancial disclosure,
production eciency, and insider trading. Journal of accounting research pp. 122.
Barkalay, M., Holderness, C., 1989. Private benets of control of public corporation. Journal
of Financial Economics .
Bartelsman, E. J., Doms, M., 2000. Understanding productivity: lessons from longitudinal
microdata. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-19, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Baumol, W. J., 1982. Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure.
American Economic Review 72, 115.
Becht, M., Bolton, P., Roell, A., 2003. Corporate governance and control. Handbook of the
Economics of Finance 1, 1109.
Belenzon, S., Andrea, P., 2011. Managerial redeployment, ownership structure, and family
ties. Working paper .
Belenzon, S., Berkovitz, T., 2010. Innovation in business groups. Management Science 56,
519535.
Bena, J., Ortiz-Molina, H., 2013. Pyramidal ownership and the creation of new rms. Journal
of Financial Economics 108, 798821.
Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., Thesmar, D., 2007. Banking deregulation and industry structure:
Evidence from the french banking reforms of 1985. The Journal of Finance 62, 597628.
128
Black, B. S., Gilson, R. J., 1998. Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks
versus stock markets. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 243277.
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M., 2002. Venture capital in europe and the nancing of innovative
companies. Economic Policy 17, 229270.
Brenner, S., 2011. On the irrelevance of insider trading for managerial compensation. Euro-
pean Economic Review 55, 293303.
Brochet, F., 2010. Information content of insider trades before and after the sarbanes-oxley
act. The Accounting Review 85, 419446.
Carlton, D. W., Fischel, D. R., 1983. The regulation of insider trading. Stanford Law Review
pp. 857895.
Carter, M. L., Mansi, S. A., Reeb, D. M., 2003. Quasi-private information and insider trading.
Financial Analysts Journal 59, 6068.
Cetorelli, N., Strahan, P. E., 2006. Finance as a barrier to entry: Bank competition and
industry structure in local us markets. The Journal of Finance 61, 437461.
Chamberlain, G., 1994. Quantile regression, censoring, and the structure of wages. In: Ad-
vances in Econometrics: Sixth World Congress , vol. 2, pp. 171209.
Christopoulou, R., Vermeulen, P., 2012. Markups in the euro area and the us over the period
19812004: a comparison of 50 sectors. Empirical Economics 42, 5377.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L. H., 2000. The separation of ownership and control
in east asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81112, special Issue on
International Corporate Governance.
129
Coase, R. H., 1937. The nature of the rm. Economica 4, 386405.
Coee Jr, J. C., 1998. Future as history: The prospects for global convergence in corporate
governance and its implications. Nw. UL Rev. 93, 641.
Conway, P., Janod, V., Nicoletti, G., 2005. Product market regulation in oecd countries.
OECD Publishing .
Conway, P., Rosa, D. D., Nicoletti, G., Steiner, F., 2006. Regulation, competition and pro-
ductivity convergence. OECD Publishing .
Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., McConnell, J. J., 2008. Dominant shareholders, corporate boards,
and corporate value: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 73100.
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., 1985. Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public
corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of Financial economics 14, 3369.
Demsetz, H., 1973. Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy. Journal of Law and
economics pp. 19.
Denis, D. J., Xu, J., 2013. Insider trading restrictions and top executive compensation.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 56, 91112.
Doidge, C., 2004. Us cross-listings and the private benets of control: evidence from dual-
class rms. Journal of nancial economics 72, 519553.
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G. A., Stulz, R. M., 2007. Why do countries matter so much for corpo-
rate governance? Journal of Financial Economics 86, 139.
Dyck, A., Zingales, L., 2004. Private benets of control: An international comparison. The
Journal of Finance 59, 537600.
130
Egger, H., Egger, P., Kreickemeier, U., 2013a. Trade, wages, and prots. European Economic
Review 64, 332350.
Egger, P. H., Erhardt, K., Lassmann, A., 2003. Psmatch2: Stata module to perform full
mahalanobis and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and covariate
imbalance testing. Unpublished Working Paper V. 4.0.6 (http://ideas.repec.org/c/
boc/bocode/s432001.html).
Egger, P. H., Erhardt, K., Lassmann, A., 2013b. Productivity and r&d as drivers of exports
and domestic sales: Semiparametric evidence from french rm-level data. Working Paper
.
Fidrmuc, J. P., Goergen, M., Renneboog, L., 2006. Insider trading, news releases, and own-
ership concentration. The Journal of Finance 61, 29312973.
Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J., Krizan, C. J., 2006. Market selection, reallocation, and restruc-
turing in the us retail trade sector in the 1990s. The Review of Economics and Statistics
88, 748758.
Francois, J. F., Wooton, I., 2008. Market structure and market access. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper .
Friederich, S., Gregory, A., Matatko, J., Tonks, I., 2002. Short-run returns around the trades
of corporate insiders on the london stock exchange. European Financial Management 8,
730.
Gibbons, R., Henderson, R., 2011. Relational contracts, managerial practices, and organiza-
tional capabilities. Handbook of Organizational Economics, eds. R. Gibbons and J. Roberts
.
131
Gillan, S., Starks, L. T., 2003. Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and the role of
institutional investors: A global perspective. Journal of applied Finance 13.
Giroud, X., Mueller, H. M., 2010. Does corporate governance matter in competitive indus-
tries? Journal of Financial Economics 95, 312331.
Gomes, A., 2000. Going public without governance: Managerial reputation eects. Journal
of Finance 55, 615646.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A., 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics pp. 107155.
Gompers, P., Lerner, J., 2000. Money chasing deals? the impact of fund inows on private
equity valuation. Journal of Financial Economics 55, 281325.
Gopalan, R., Nanda, V., Seru, A., 2007. Aliated rms and nancial support: Evidence
from indian business groups. Journal of Financial Economics 86, 759795.
Gopalan, R., Nanda, V., Seru, A., 2014. Internal capital market and dividend policies:
Evidence from business groups. Review of Financial Studies 27, 11021142.
Gorman, M., Sahlman, W. A., 1989. What do venture capitalists do? Journal of Business
Venturing 4, 231248.
Hail, L., Leuz, C., 2009. Cost of capital eects and changes in growth expectations around
U.S. cross-listings. Journal of Financial Economics 93, 428454.
Hall, B. H., Lerner, J., 2010. Chapter 14 - the nancing of r&d and innovation. In: Hall,
B. H., Rosenberg, N. (eds.), Handbook of The Economics of Innovation, Vol. 1 , North-
Holland, vol. 1 of Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, pp. 609639.
132
Hamelin, A., 2011. Small business groups enhance performance and promote stability, not
expropriation. evidence from french smes. Journal of Banking & Finance 35, 613  626.
Hellmann, T., Puri, M., 2002. Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up rms:
Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance 57, 169197.
Hermalin, B. E., 1992. The eects of competition on executive behavior. The RAND Journal
of Economics pp. 350365.
Heron, R. A., Lie, E., 2007. Does backdating explain the stock price pattern around executive
stock option grants? Journal of Financial Economics 83, 271295.
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., Palia, D., 1999. Understanding the determinants of
managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of nan-
cial economics 53, 353384.
Himmerlberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., Palia, D., 1999. Understanding the determinants of
managerial ownership and link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial
Economics 53, 353384.
Hochberg, Y. V., Ljungqvist, A., Lu, Y., 2007. Whom you know matters: Venture capital
networks and investment performance. The Journal of Finance 62, 251301.
Holmstrom, B. R., Tirole, J., 1989. The theory of the rm. Handbook of Industrial Organi-
zation 1, 61133.
Hsieh, T.-J., Yeh, R.-S., Chen, Y.-J., 2010. Business group characteristics and aliated rm
innovation: The case of taiwan. Industrial Marketing Management 39, 560570.
Iacobucci, D., 2002. Explaining business groups started by habitual entrepreneurs in the
italian manufacturing sector. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 14, 3147.
133
Iacobucci, D., Rosa, P., 2005. Growth, diversication, and business group formation in en-
trepreneurial rms. Small Business Economics 25, 6582.
Ivanov, V. I., Xie, F., 2010. Do corporate venture capitalists add value to start-up rms?
evidence from ipos and acquisitions of vc-backed companies. Financial Management 39,
129152.
Jeng, L. A., Metrick, A., Zeckhauser, R., 2003. Estimating the returns to insider trading: A
performance-evaluation perspective. Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 453471.
Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the rm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure. Journal of nancial economics 3, 305360.
Kandel, E., Kosenko, Konstantin, Morck, R., Yafeh, Y., 2013. Business groups in the united
states: A revised history of corporate ownership, pyramids and regulation, 1930-1950.
Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel. Discussion paper series. .
Kato, T., Hebner, K. J., 1997. Insider trading and executive compensation: Evidence from
the us and japan. International Review of Economics & Finance 6, 223237.
Khanna, T., 2000. Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets: Existing evidence
and unanswered questions. European Economic Review 44, 748761.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 1999. Policy shocks, market intermediaries, and corporate strategy:
The evolution of business groups in chile and india. Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 8, 271310.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000. Is group aliation protable in emerging markets? an analysis
of diversied indian business groups. Journal of Finance 55, 867891.
134
Khanna, T., Yafeh, Y., 2005. Business groups and risk sharing around the world. Journal of
Business 78, 301340.
Khanna, T., Yafeh, Y., 2007. Business groups in emerging markets: Paragons or parasites?
Journal of Economic Literature 45, 331372.
Klapper, L., Laeven, L., Rajan, R., 2006. Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship.
Journal of Financial Economics 82, 591629.
Koenker, R., Bassett Jr, G., 1978. Regression quantiles. Econometrica: journal of the Econo-
metric Society pp. 3350.
Koenker, R., Hallock, K., 2001. Quantile regression: An introduction. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 15, 4356.
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the
world. The Journal of Finance 54, 471517.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Investor protection and
corporate governance. Journal of nancial economics 58, 327.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 1998. Law and nance. The
Journal of Political Economy 106, 11131155.
Lakonishok, J., Lee, I., 2001. Are insider trades informative? Review of nancial studies 14,
7911.
Larrain, M., Stumpner, S., 2013. Financial reforms and aggregate productivity: The microe-
conomic channels. Working Paper .
135
Lease, R. C., McConnell, J. J., Mikkelson, W. H., 1983. The market value of control in
publicly-traded corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 439471.
Lechner, C., Leyronas, C., 2009. Small-business group formation as an entrepreneurial de-
velopment model. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 33, 645667.
Manne, H. G., 1966. Insider trading and the stock market. Free Press.
Masulis, R. W., Pham, P. K., Zein, J., 2011. Family business groups around the world:
Financing advantages, control motivations, and organizational choices. Review of Financial
Studies 24, 35563600.
Morck, R., 2003. Why some double taxation might make sense: The special case of inter-
corporate dividends. NBER Working Papers .
Morck, R., 2005. How to eliminate pyramidal business groups: The double taxation of in-
tercorporate dividends and other incisive uses of tax policy. NBER/Tax Policy & the
Economy (MIT Press) 19, 135179.
Morck, R., Nakamura, M., 1999. Banks and corporate control in japan. Journal of Finance
54, 319339.
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., Yeung, B., 2005. Corporate governance, economic entrenchment,
and growth. Journal of Economic Literature 43, 655720.
Morck, R. K., Stangeland, D. A., Yeung, B., 1998. Inherited wealth, corporate control and
economic growth: The canadian disease. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Nenova, T., 2003. The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis.
Journal of Financial Economics 68, 325351.
136
Piketty, T., Saez, E., 2003. Income inequality in the united states, 1913-1998. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics pp. 139.
Raith, M., 2003. Competition, risk, and managerial incentives. American Economic Review
pp. 14251436.
Rajan, R. G., Zingales, L., 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic
Review pp. 559586.
Ravina, E., Sapienza, P., 2010. What do independent directors know? evidence from their
trading. Review of Financial Studies 23, 9621003.
Reese, W. A., Weisbach, M. S., 2002. Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-
listings in the united states, and subsequent equity oerings. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 66, 65104.
Roe, M. J., 2003. Political determinants of corporate governance: Political context, corporate
impact. Oxford University Press.
Rosa, P., Scott, M., 1999. The prevalence of multiple owners and directors in the sme sector:
implications for our understanding of start-up and growth. Entrepreneurship & Regional
Development 11, 2137.
Rosenthal, L., Young, C., 1990. The seemingly anomalous price behavior of royal dutch/shell
and unilever nv/plc. Journal of Financial Economics 26, 123141.
Roulstone, D. T., 2003. The relation between insider-trading restrictions and executive com-
pensation. Journal of Accounting Research pp. 525551.
Sautner, Z., Villalonga, B., 2010. Corporate governance and internal capital markets. Work-
ing Paper .
137
Scharfstein, D., 1988. Product-market competition and managerial slack. The RAND Journal
of Economics pp. 147155.
Schmalensee, R., 2007. Handbook of industrial organization, vol. 3. Elsevier.
Schmitz Jr, J. A., 2005. What determines productivity? lessons from the dramatic recovery
of the us and canadian iron ore industries following their early 1980s crisis. Journal of
Political Economy 113, 582625.
Schumpeter, J. A., 1934. The theory of economic development: An inquiry into prots,
capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle, vol. 55. Transaction publishers.
Sea-Jin, C., Chi-Nien, C., Mahmood, I. P., 2006. When and how does business group al-
iation promote rm innovation? a tale of two emerging economies. Organization Science
17, 637656.
Seru, A., 2014. Firm boundaries matter: Evidence from conglomerates and R&D activity.
Journal of Financial Economics 111, 381405.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The journal of nance
52, 737783.
Smith, A., 1937. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
§²§Ú§á§à§Ý §¬§Ý§Ñ§ã§ã§Ú§Ü.
Stigler, G. J., 1958. The economies of scale. Journal of Law and Economics 1, 4.
Stigler, G. J., 1963. Capital and rates of return in manufacturing industries. NBER Books .
Stulz, R. M., 1999. Golbalization, corporate nance, and the cost of capital. Journal of
applied corporate nance 12, 825.
138
Syverson, C., 2004a. Market structure and productivity: A concrete example. Journal of
political economy 112, 11811222.
Syverson, C., 2004b. Product substitutability and productivity dispersion. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 86, 534550.
Trapani, T., 1990. The relationship between ceo compensation and ceo trading prots. Ph.
D. Dissertation, University of Kansas .
Villalonga, B., Amit, R., 2006. How do family ownership, control and management aect
rm value?. Journal of Financial Economics 80, 385417.
Wang, W., Shin, Y.-C., Francis, B. B., 2012. Are cfos¡¯ trades more informative than ceos¡¯
trades? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47, 743762.
Williamson, O. E., 1973. Markets and hierarchies: Some elementary considerations. The
American Economic Review 63, 316325.
Zhang, W., Cahan, S. F., Allen, A. C., 2005. Insider trading and pay-performance sensitivity:
An empirical analysis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 32, 18871919.
Zingales, L., 1994. The value of the voting right: A study of the milan stock exchange
experience. Review of nancial Studies 7, 125148.
Zingales, L., 1995. What determines the value of corporate votes? The Quarterly Journal of
Economics pp. 10471073.
Zwiebel, J., 1995. Block investment and partial benets of corporate control. The Review of





Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 An Example of Cluster Construction
In this section, I present an example of cluster construction through iterations. For a given
sample of rms, I rst identify potential ultimate owners. Then starting from the bottom of
the ownership chain, I assign rms to dierent clusters by checking the xed point require-
ments. When a rm has multiple parent shareholders, it will be assigned to the cluster with
highest total cluster holding.
In the above graph, A, B, C, and D are four rms. Arrows are pointing from shareholders
to subsidiaries. Numbers beside arrows indicate ownership stakes. Given the preset cuto
value α = 30%, clusters are constructed after three rounds.
 Iteration 1: Firm A, B and D do not have any corporate shareholder with ownership
stake more than 30%. They are potential ultimate owners. For rm C, the total stake
from cluster formed by A is 45%, while the total stake from cluster formed by D is 5%.
Thus, C is assigned to Cluster A.1 Firm E only has one corporate shareholder B. It is












assigned to Cluster B. Therefore, after the rst iteration, the ve rms are assigned to
three dierent clusters:
A,C → Cluster A
B,E → Cluster B
D → Cluster D
 Iteration 2: Firm A is still the ultimate owner. Firm B has two corporate shareholders,
A and C. Notice that rm C has been assigned to Cluster A. Therefore the total holding
from the cluster formed by A is 15%+25% = 40% > 30%. Thus B is assigned to Cluster
A. Nothing changed for rm C. Firm D has two corporate shareholders, A and B. They
belong to Cluster A and Cluster B respectively. The total holding from cluster A is
10% < 30%. The total holding from cluster B is 11% < 30%. Therefore it is still
assigned to the cluster formed by itself. For rm E, since rm B was identied as a
potential ultimate owner in the last round, the rm E is still assigned to Cluster B.
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After the second iteration, the ve rms are still assigned to three dierent clusters:
A,B,C → Cluster A
E → Cluster B
D → Cluster D
 Iteration 3: Nothing changed for rm A, B, C. For rm E, since B was assigned to
Cluster A, the total holding from the Cluster A is 35% > 30%. B is also assigned to
cluster A. For rm D, its two corporate shareholders, A and B, both belong to cluster
A. The total holding from Cluster A is 10% + 11% = 21% < 30%. Thus, it is still
assigned to Cluster D. After this round, ve rms are assigned to two clusters.
A,B,C,E → Cluster A
D → Cluster D
Following calculations double check the total cluster holdings for each rms:
 Firm A: the ultimate owner for Cluster A.
 Firm B: 15% + 25% = 40% > 30%.
 Firm C: 45% > 30%.
 Firm E: 45% > 30%.













A.2 An Example of Unintentional Group Aliation  Ac-
tive Audio
Active Audio is founded in 2002 by Xavier Meynial, at that time Professor and researcher at
the Acoustics Laboratory of the UniversitÃ© du Maine (France). Active Audio's objective
was to create a commercial application of research work patented under âRÃ©ecteur
Sonore Actifâ, which can be applied to the Public Address system.
Before 2005, Active Audio was jointly owned by Electronatec (33% of ownership stake),
the founder, and other private individual investors. Electronatec, including its other sub-
sidiaries, has considerable expertise in power electronics, motor design and piloting of ships.
In 2006, Electronatec was acquired by ECA, a leader in the market of intelligence robotics.
ECA is a subsidiary of Finuchem. Finuchem is a major player in the intelligent safety system.
They both belonged to a huge business group held by Jean-Pierre George family, through its
family holding company Pelican Venture. One side eect of this acquisition is that Active
Audio also joins the big business group.
According to ECA's ling, the acquisition is driven by the synergies between ECA and
Electronatec. Electronatec was very present on the market for naval facilities in France, a
sector in which ECA wanted to develop. Conversely, little Electronatec exported its solutions.
ECA would help achieve the export growth particulary in the framework of the European
shipbuilding industry. Active Audio was very small compared to Electronatec and its other
subsidiaries. Besides, Active Audio was not mentioned as any part of the stated acquisition
synergies.
Two years after unintentionally joining the group, Active Audio's protability doubled.
Its adjusted revenue and market share tripled.
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Table A.1: BUSINESS GROUP IS THE DOMINANT OWNERSHIP
STRUCTURE FOR NEW FIRMS ACROSS COUNTRIES
This table show the contributions of business groups aliated rm-year observations across
countries. The second column shows the total number of rm-year observations across countries.
The third column reports ratios of group aliated rm-year observations. The fourth column is
the sum of group aliated rms' total assets over the sum of all new rms' total assets for the
respective country. The last two columns show the similar ratios using total revenue and number
of employees.
Percentage Contributed by Group Aliated Observations
Country No. of Obs. No. of Obs. Total Assets Total Revenue No. of Employees
Austria 1,925 43.48% 56.69% 56.23% 55.34%
Belgium 41,600 31.73% 58.83% 63.97% 54.79%
Bulgaria 9,958 6.09% 21.92% 17.34% 13.52%
Czech Republic 15,884 5.41% 33.29% 30.70% 22.10%
Crotia 3,295 14.90% 36.21% 39.98% 34.18%
Denmark 120,668 11.20% 42.94% 55.61% 33.88%
Estonia 7,362 6.32% 24.15% 21.07% 19.12%
Finland 6,323 45.52% 68.51% 65.80% 64.10%
France 313,177 20.22% 62.69% 53.11% 52.60%
Germany 75,541 23.05% 50.49% 48.42% 50.14%
Greece 29,149 6.90% 20.98% 19.99% 14.70%
Hungary 8,855 4.21% 23.22% 21.58% 15.47%
Hungary 750 10.67% 22.76% 20.17% 14.40%
Iceland 2,064 8.38% 27.95% 24.62% 17.11%
Italy 26,389 39.49% 43.19% 39.15% 41.18%
Luxemburg 347 19.02% 35.65% 36.07% 30.19%
Latvia 66 24.24% 40.59% 52.05% 39.29%
Norway 234,165 10.06% 40.65% 32.79% 24.61%
Poland 14,969 8.63% 29.91% 24.57% 23.06%
Portugal 89,542 2.79% 30.92% 24.82% 13.31%
Romania 385,711 0.85% 15.69% 13.33% 5.88%
Spain 254,775 13.39% 48.19% 41.06% 32.97%
Switzeland 283 37.46% 40.38% 38.34% 61.26%
United Kindom 416,890 9.58% 56.58% 53.01% 56.48%
Total 2,059,688 11.24% 50.57% 46.28% 38.85%
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Table A.2: BUSINESS GROUP IS THE DOMINANT OWNERSHIP
STRUCTURE FOR NEW FIRMS ACROSS YEARS
This table show the contributions of business groups aliated rm-year observations across years.
The second column shows the total number of rm-year observations across years. The third
column reports ratios of group aliated rm-year observations. The fourth column is the sum of
group aliated rms' total assets over the sum of all new rms' total assets for the respective
year. The last two columns show the similar ratios using total revenue and number of employees.
Percentage Contributed by Group Aliated Observations
Year No. of Obs. No. of Obs. Total Assets Total Revenue No. of Employees
1999 52,270 12.85% 36.87% 33.71% 28.44%
2000 146,747 9.44% 45.37% 40.83% 31.36%
2001 162,418 13.01% 52.41% 49.39% 39.03%
2002 175,255 13.43% 54.92% 51.54% 41.46%
2003 226,217 11.61% 53.54% 49.56% 41.29%
2004 321,052 9.27% 50.12% 45.49% 38.36%
2005 391,810 9.71% 52.16% 47.62% 39.00%
2006 258,663 14.05% 51.82% 47.45% 44.13%
2007 298,953 10.98% 48.15% 43.42% 38.39%
2008 26,303 11.52% 52.66% 49.18% 48.45%







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix for Chapter 3
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